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Combatting Corruption in the “Era of Xi Jinping”:
A Law and Economics Perspective
MIRON MUSHKAT AND RODA MUSHKAT
Abstract
Pervasive graft, widely observed throughout Chinese history but
deprived of proper outlets and suppressed in the years following the
Communist Revolution, resurfaced on massive scale when partial
marketization of the economy was embraced in 1978 and beyond. The
authorities had endeavored to alleviate the problem, but in an uneven and
less than determined fashion. The battle against corruption has greatly
intensified after Xi Jinping ascended to power in 2012. The multiyear
antigraft campaign that has unfolded has been carried out in an ironfisted and
relentless fashion. It has yielded some tangible benefits, yet the negative side
of the ledger is heavily loaded. Absent broad-based institutional
reengineering, the ambitious and costly program’s long-term future may not
be assured.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction .................................................................................. 138
II. Chinese Conceptions of Corruption .......................................... 144
III. Variety of Chinese Corrupt Practices ........................................ 151
IV. Roots of Chinese Corruption ..................................................... 155
V. Law and Economics Angle ........................................................ 163
VI. The Era of Xi Jinping ................................................................ 178
VII.
The Current Anticorruption Campaign ............................... 187
VIII. Evaluation ........................................................................... 197
IX. Conclusion ................................................................................. 207
 Visiting Professor of Managerial Economics and Corporate Finance, MBA Program,
College of Business Administration, University of Northern Iowa and Adjunct Professor of
International Economics and Finance, Graduate School, Faculty of Social Science, Chinese
University of Hong Kong.
 Professor of International Law, Hopkins-Nanjing Center, Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University and Honorary Professor,
Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong.
137

2 - Mushkat_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete)

138

5/1/2020 4:08 PM

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 43:2

I. Introduction
With few, often ideologically driven exceptions,1 post-1949
revolutionary-era China has been critically portrayed, and harshly so, by
academic researchers and policy analysts.2 The new regime’s institutional
foundations and politico-economic strategies have been subjected to
relentlessly unfavorable scrutiny.3 The brutalities and human costs of the
1958-62 Great Leap Forward and the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution have been
highlighted in particularly strident terms.4 The mixture of organizational
fragility and personal excesses, perhaps even turpitude, accounting for such
transgressions have been copiously documented and unreservedly pilloried.5
This firmly entrenched and normatively well-underpinned trend came
to an abrupt end in 1978, two years following the death in 1976 of Mao
Zedong, who had cast a long shadow over the Chinese scene since the
founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). His reformist successors,
spearheaded by paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, have embraced the “Open
Door Policy” and have proceeded to implement a series of measures
designed to integrate the Chinese economy with that of the rest of the
(essentially capitalist) world.6 Partial economic liberalization has coincided
with a degree of political relaxation, or a shift from “hard authoritarianism”
to a more palatable version depicted as either “pragmatic” or “soft.”7
The opening up of the economy, coupled with corresponding domestic
restructuring in a less oppressive and more stable and transparent policy
setting, has yielded substantial dividends in the form of rapid economic
growth over a long period of time, perhaps remarkable for such a populous
country.8 This, in turn, has given rise to a voluminous literature on China’s
spectacular rise, the Chinese miracle, and the unmistakable emergence of a

1. See, e.g., WAS MAO REALLY A MONSTER? THE ACADEMIC RESPONSE TO CHANG AND
HALLIDAY’S MAO: THE UNKNOWN STORY (Gregory Benton & Lin Chun eds., 2010).
2. See, e.g., JUNG CHANG & JON HALLIDAY, MAO: THE UNKNOWN STORY (2006).
3. See, e.g., id.
4. See, e.g., id.
5. See, e.g., id.
6. See generally KEVIN B. BUCKNALL, CHINA AND THE OPEN DOOR POLICY (1990).
7. See generally Minxin Pei, China’s Evolution Toward Soft Authoritarianism, in
WHAT IF CHINA DOES NOT DEMOCRATIZE? IMPLICATIONS FOR WAR AND PEACE 75 (Edward
Friedman & Barrett L. McCormick eds., 2000); HONGYI LAI, CHINA’S GOVERNANCE MODEL:
FLEXIBILTY AND DURABILITY OF PRAGMATIC AUTHORITARIANISM (2016).
8. See generally LINDA YUEH, CHINA’S GROWTH: THE MAKING OF AN ECONOMIC
SUPERPOWER (2013).
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new superpower.9 A recurring theme in this body of work has been that a
salient feature of this extraordinary structural transformation has been its
peaceful nature,10 entailing the reconfiguration of China from a revisionist to
a status quo power.11 The Chinese “harmonious world” blueprint12 and “good
neighbor” strategy13 have been invoked to pinpoint concrete manifestations
of this salutary pattern.
Such construction, while not inaccurate, has notable limitations
stemming from its oversimplification of complex realities. First, the
robustness of data relied upon in this context is seldom called into question.14
Second, China’s meteoric rise may have been due to one-time special
conditions which may not repeat themselves.15 Third, even if this has not
been a decisive element of the developmental equation, and the key
explanation, conventional16 or unconventional,17 lies in the institutional
domain, it is appropriate to employ counterfactual logic18 and pose the

9. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: HOW ECONOMIC REFORM IS
CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER (1994).
10. See, e.g., OVERHOLT, supra note 9; YUEH, supra note 8.
11. See generally Lye Liang Fook, China in World Politics: Is China a Status Quo
Power?, 15 CHINA: AN IINT’L. J. 1, 3 (2017).
12. See generally HARMONIOUS WORLD AND CHINA’S NEW FOREIGN POLICY (Sujian Guo
& Jean-Marc F. Blanchard eds., Lexington Books 2010); ROSITA DELIOS & R. JAMES
FERGUSON, CHINA’S QUEST FOR GLOBAL ORDER: FROM PEACEFUL RISE TO HARMONIOUS
WORLD (2013); ASTRID H. M. NORDIN, CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
HARMONIOUS WORLD (2016).
13. See generally CHIEN-PENG CHUNG, CHINA’S MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN ASIA
AND THE PACIFIC: INSTITUTIONALIZING BEIJING’S “GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY” (2010); STEVEN
F. JACKSON, CHINA’S REGIONAL RELATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: FROM
HARMONIOUS NEIGHBORS TO STRATEGIC PARTNERS (2018).
14. See Michael T. Owyang & Hannah G. Shell, China’s Economic Data: An Accurate
Reflection, or Just Smoke and Mirrors?, 25 REGIONAL ECONOMIST 6, 12 (2017).
15. See generally Wing Thye Woo, The Real Reasons for China’s Growth, 41 CHINA J.
115 (1999); DWIGHT H. PERKINS, THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA (World
Scientific 2015).
16. See generally JUSTIN YIFU LIN, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITION:
THOUGHT, STRATEGY, AND VIABILITY (2009); JUSTIN YIFU LIN, DEMYSTIFYING THE CHINESE
ECONOMY (2012); GOVERNING RAPID GROWTH IN CHINA: EQUITY AND INSTITUTIONS (Ravi
Kanbur & Xiaobo Zhang eds., 2013); YUEN YUEN ANG, HOW CHINA ESCAPED THE POVERTY
TRAP (2016); SEBASTIAN HEILMANN, RED SWAN: HOW UNORTHODOX POLICY MAKING
FACILITATED CHINA’S RISE (2018).
17. See generally Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and
Development, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1076 (2011).
18. See generally Roda Mushkat, Counterfactual Reasoning: An Effective Component of
the International Law Methodological Armor?, 18 GERMAN L.J. 59 (2017).
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question whether under alternative institutional scenarios (e.g., Hong Kong,
Singaporean, or Taiwanese-style regime) overall performance would have
not been even better. Fourth, institutions that had served the country
effectively during industrialization may be ill-suited for a consumption-led,
knowledge-based, and service-propelled economy.19
Fifth, as the preceding argument elucidates, the pitfalls of mechanically
extrapolating from the past should not be overlooked.20 As the example of
the once dynamic but now static Japanese economic system vividly
illustrates, historical evolution is not devoid of unexpected twists and turns.21
It is reasonable to assume that China’s future is shrouded in uncertainty.
Indeed, there are legitimate concerns about the Chinese juggernaut losing its
supposed vibrancy and being caught in the notorious “middle-income
trap.”22 By the same token, China’s rise, if sustained, need not necessarily
remain peaceful. The truth of the matter is that there are indications that the
“harmonious society” vision and the “good neighbor” posture may have been
relegated to the backburner.23 The comforting image of a “status quo power”
19. See generally SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE POWER (2008); DARON ACEMOGLU
& JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND
POVERTY (2012); KUI-WAI LI, ECONOMIC FREEDOM: LESSONS OF HONG KONG (2012); DAVID
SHAMBAUGH, CHINA GOES GLOBAL: THE PARTIAL POWER (2013); MINXIN PEI, CHINA’S CRONY
CAPITALISM: THE DYNAMICS OF REGIME DECAY (2016); DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA’S FUTURE
(2016); Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, The Once and Future Superpower: Why
China Won’t Overtake the United States, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May/June 2016), https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower (last
visited Aug. 31, 2019); Roger Bootle, China’s Attempt to Overtake US as World’s Biggest
Economy May Fail, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 4, 2018, 8:50 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
business/2018/03/04/chinas-attempt-overtake-us-worlds-biggest-economy-may-fail/ (last
visited Aug. 31, 2019); Heritage Foundation, Societies Thrive as Economic Freedom Grows,
https://www.heritage.org/index/book/chapter-2 (last visited Aug. 31, 2019); ECONOMIST,
Economics and the Rule of Law: Order in the Jungle, http://www.economist.com/node/
10849115 (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
20. See generally Charles F. Duran, Why Forecasts Fail: The Limits and Potential of
Forecasting in International Relations and Economics, 1 INT’L STUDIES REV. 11 (1999).
21. See generally JAPAN’S LOST DECADE: ORIGINS, CONSEQUENCES, AND PROSPECTS FOR
RECOVERY (Gary R, Saxonhouse & Robert M. Stern eds., 2004).
22. See generally A NEW ECONOMIC GROWTH ENGINE FOR CHINA: ESCAPING THE
MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP BY NOT DOING MORE OF THE SAME (Wing Thye Woo et al. eds., 2012);
ASIA AND THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP (Francis E. Hutchison & Sanchita Basu Das eds., 2016);
CHINA’S INNOVATION CHALLENGE: OVERCOMING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP (Arie Y. Lewin,
Martin Kenney, & Johann P. Murmann eds., 2016); AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP IN
ASIA: THE ROLE OF MANUFACTURING, TRADE, AND FINANCE (Naoyuki Yoshino et al. eds.,
2018).
23. See generally Suisheng Zhao, Rethinking the Chinese World Order: The Imperial
Cycle and the Rise of China 24 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 961 (2015); Chris Buckley, Xi of Two
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has accordingly given way to the less reassuring picture of an “assertive
status quo power.”24
Sixth, the writings on the Chinese miracle obscure the “dark side” of
the historical record. China’s economic growth has consumed vast resources
and has involved a massive misallocation of capital.25 The economy has been
plagued by enormous distortions.26 Regional disparities27 and social
inequality28 have escalated dramatically.29 Large-scale poverty has
continued to rear its ugly head.30 The regime has failed to deliver adequate
education31 and healthcare32 to its people. The regulation of risk has been a
shambles.33 The one-child policy has sown the seeds of demographic
stagnation.34 The needs of aging population have not been properly

Minds: To Be Good Neighbor or Assert China’s Power?, NEW YORK TIMES: SINOSPHERE
(June 12, 2014), https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/xi-of-two-minds-be-a-goo
d-neighbor-or-assert-chinas-power/?mtrref=www.google.com.hk&gwh=42DC74657B69E0
56A78697E19A6971F4&gwt=pay; Zhu Feng, The Limits of Power: Why China Is a Bad
Neighbor, FIRSTPOST (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.firstpost.com/world/the-limits-of-powerwhy-china-is-a-bad-neighbour-120299.html; Yang Hengjun, Why Are China’s Neighbors So
Afraid of Her?, DIPLOMAT (May 23, 2014), https://thediplomat.com/2014/05/why-are-chinasneighbors-so-afraid-of-her/.
24. See generally Robert Farley, China Might Be Just an Assertive Status Quo Power,
DIPLOMAT (Aug. 29, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/china-might-just-be-an-assert
ive-status-quo-power/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
25. See generally Damien Cubizol, Transition and Capital Misallocation: The Chinese
Case, 81 J. OF INT’L MONEY & FIN. 88 (2018).
26. See generally CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (Yiping Huang &
Miaojie Yu eds., 2013).
27. See generally YANQING JIANG, OPENNESS, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND REGIONAL
DISPARITIES: THE CASE OF CHINA (2013).
28. See generally UNDERSTANDING INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN CHINA: METHODS AND
APPLICATIONS (Guanghua Wan ed., 2008).
29. See generally id.
30. See generally id.
31. See generally YONG ZHAO, WHO’S AFRAID OF THE BIG BAD DRAGON? WHY CHINA
HAS THE BEST (AND WORST) EDUCATION SYSTEM IN THE WORLD (2014).
32. See generally GUANQI ZHOU, THE REGULATORY REGIME OF FOOD SAFETY IN CHINA:
GOVERNANCE AND SEGMENTATION (2017).
33. See generally ROBERT STOWE ENGLAND, AGING CHINA: THE DEMOGRAPHIC
CHALLENGE TO CHINA’S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS (2005).
34. See generally Robert C. Pozen, Tackling the Chinese Pension System, BROOKINGS,
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/31-reforming-chinese-pension-syst
em-pozen.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
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addressed.35 Environmental degradation has reached mammoth
proportions.36 Financial fragility has significantly intensified.37
Seventh, the entire network of interpersonal exchanges—economic,
political, and social—has been literally drowning in corruption.38 Because of
lack of opportunities, it may have lurked below the surface during the
prereform era, but it has forcefully burst into the open shortly thereafter.39
Rather paradoxically, unlike in other similar historical cases, rampant
Chinese corruption has mushroomed, rather than moderated, as prosperity
has spread and the standard of living has climbed.40 While thus far it has not
exacted a heavy economic toll and has not materially undermined political
stability, there is empirical evidence to suggest that it may have the potential
to inflict such damage.41
The post-1978 regime has not been oblivious to the breadth, depth, and
pernicious consequences of the problem.42 Some general initiatives—such
35. See generally Robert C. Pozen, Tackling the Chinese Pension System, BROOKINGS
(July 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/31-reforming-chinesepension-system-pozen.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
36. See generally CARL WALTER & FRASE J. T. HOWIE, RED CAPITALISM: THE FRAGILE
FINANCIAL FOUNDATION OF CHINA’S EXTRAORDINARY RISE (2012); DINNY MCMAHON,
CHINA’S GREAT WALL OF DEBT: SHADOW BANKING, GHOST CITIES, MASSIVE LOANS, AND THE
END OF THE CHINESE MIRACLE (2018); Economist, China’s Financial System: The Coming
Debt Bust, ECONOMIST (May 7, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21698240it-question-when-not-if-real-trouble-will-hit-china-coming-debt-bust (last visited Aug. 31,
2019).
37. See generally CARL E. WALTER & FRASE J. T. HOWIE, RED CAPITALISM: THE FRAGILE
FINANCIAL FOUNDATION OF CHINA’S EXTRAORDINARY RISE (2012); DINNY MCMAHON,
CHINA’S GREAT WALL OF DEBT: SHADOW BANKING, GHOST CITIES, MASSIVE LOANS, AND THE
END OF THE CHINESE MIRACLE (2018); Economist, China’s Financial System: The Coming
Debt Bust, ECONOMIST (May 7, 2016), https:// www.economist.com/news/leaders/21698240it-question-when-not-if-real-trouble-will-hit-china-coming-debt-bust (last visited Aug. 31,
2019).
38. See generally PEI, supra note 19; Zengke He, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in
Reform China, 33 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 243 (2000); Andrew Wedeman,
The Intensification of Corruption in China, 180 CHINA Q. 895 (2004); Yong Guo, Corruption
in Transitional China: An Empirical Analysis, 194 CHINA Q. 349 (2008); Andrew Wedeman,
Corruption and Collective Protest in China, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CORRUPTION IN
CHINA 179 (Ting Gong & Ian Scott eds., 2017).
39. See generally PEI, supra note 19; Guo, supra note 38; He, supra note 38; Wedeman,
Corruption and Collective Protest in China, supra note 38.
40. See generally Yukon Huang, The Truth about Chinese Corruption, DIPLOMAT (May
29, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/the-truth-about-chinese-corruption/ (last visited
Aug. 31, 2019).
41. See generally id.
42. See generally He, supra note 38.
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as modest loosening of authoritarian controls, possibly qualifying as limited
democratization,43 and revamping of the bureaucratic apparatus, with a view
to enhancing its responsiveness44—have reflected mounting concerns about
the corrosive nature of widespread corruption and attempts to contain it
indirectly.45 A number of anticorruption campaigns have also been
periodically conducted, targeting the phenomenon directly46 and seeking to
reinforce the pressures exerted by the fledgling agencies established to
confront the issue on an ongoing basis.47 Moral education has been resorted
to as well, in an effort to formulate and pursue a well-rounded strategy.48
The effectiveness of this multipronged—but ultimately half-hearted,
scattered, shallow, and uneven—strategy has proved negligible, however.49
The current anticorruption campaign—the longest, most ferocious, and
without parallel in its unremitting flow—has vastly surpassed any top-down
mobilization endeavors witnessed since the Cultural Revolution.50 For better
or for worse, it has also produced some tangible results, even if their impact
beyond the medium-term horizon remains uncertain.51 The aim of this article
is to assess, from a law and economics perspective, which is particularly
pertinent for that purpose, the appropriateness and effectiveness of the
anticorruption drive presently waged by the Chinese authorities.
The survey focuses, in this order, on the characterization of corruption
in China, its manifestations, its origins, highlights of the economic approach
to corruption, essential features of the “Xi Jinping era,” fundamental nature
of the anticorruption campaign, and its systematic evaluation. The campaign
is the brainchild of President and General Secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping, and his close associates, and is
presented as such. It is intimately intertwined with his name, personality, and
policies. It is the single most important domestic strategic undertaking by Xi
and his inner circle and easily overshadows all their other major policy
initiatives. Indeed, the current anticorruption drive could be said to define

43. See id. at 265.
44. See id. at 265-266.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 267-268.
47. See id. at 266-267.
48. See id. at 268-269.
49. See generally id.
50. See generally Guilhem Fabre, Xi Jinping’s Challenge: What Is Behind China’s AntiCorruption Campaign?, 5 J. OF SELF-GOVERNANCE & MANAGEMENT ECON. 7 (2017).
51. See generally id.
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the regime. This accounts for the linkage between the campaign and the Xi
Jinping era.
II. Chinese Conceptions of Corruption
In grappling with intricate behavioral patterns, academic researchers
typically strive to strike a balance between satisfactorily capturing diversity
and realizing a meaningful degree of uniformity.52 This posture is reflected
in the exploration of corruption in China. The examination of the subject
commonly begins by laying a definitional foundation that is consistent with
international practices, rather than geared to local conditions.53 Modest
adjustments may be contemplated, but they normally do not amount to
substantial departures from widely accepted standards.54 This is generally
followed by an attempt to accommodate country-specific nuances.55
Context-free attributions of meaning range from compact to elaborate.
At the most basic level, corruption is equated in the Chinese setting with the
“misuse of public authority for private gain.”56 This conceptualization is
predicated on a clear distinction between the public and private domains,
which may be blurred in China,57 but it has nevertheless proved workable in
theoretically-inspired and empirical inquiries.58 It should be noted, however,
that it does not encompass categories of corruption that surface outside the
public realm and that it may thus be necessary to incorporate into the
definition forms of private corruption such as those observed in the corporate
sector and relating to issues of fiduciary responsibility.59

52. See, e.g., Robert Wisner, Uniformity, Diversity, and Provincial Extraterritoriality:
Hunt v. T&N plc, 40 MCGILL L.J. 759 (1995).
53. See, e.g., He, supra note 38. See also Kilkon Ko & Cuifen Weng, Critical Review of
Conceptual Definitions of Chinese Corruption: A Formal-Legal Perspective, 20 J. OF
CONTEMP. CHINA 359 (2011); Xizi Lu, A Literature Review on the Definition of Corruption
and Factors Affecting the Risk of Corruption, 4 OPEN J. SOC. SCI. 171 (2016).
54. See, e.g., He, supra note 38.
55. See, e.g., Yan Sun, The Politics of Conceptualizing Corruption in Reform China, in
4 CRITICAL READINGS ON THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 1215 (Kjeld E. Brodsgaard ed.,
2017).
56. Andrew Wedeman, The Challenge of Commercial Bribery and Organized Crime in
China, 22 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 18 (2013).
57. See JULIA KWONG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION IN CHINA (1997).
58. See, e.g., ANDREW WEDEMAN, DOUBLE PARADOX: RAPID GROWTH AND RISING
CORRUPTION IN CHINA (2012).
59. See generally Wedeman, supra note 56.
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The interplay between the public and private ingredients is at the core
of efforts to distil the essence of Chinese-style “crony capitalism” and the
corrupt practices it begets.60 This is assumed to be an institutional setting “in
which capitalists gain valuable rents from politicians”61 or, to express it in a
more nuanced fashion, “an instrumental union between capitalists and
politicians designed to acquire wealth, legally or otherwise, and the latter to
seek and retain power.”62 Putin’s Russia is also said to serve as a fertile
ground for the spread of crony capitalism and the corrupt excesses it
abundantly breeds.63
In daily discourse, the emphasis is loosely placed on the public aspects
or the generic phenomenon.64 Yichuan mou shi and jia gong ji si therefore
denote, respectively, “using one’s power or authority for private ends” and
“us[ing] public resources to manufacture privates ones.”65 Alternatively, any
symptoms of corruption may be identified with tanwu (greed and dirt), fuhua
(being rotten and decomposed), fubai (rottenness associated with poor
performance), and bu zheng zhi feng (engaging in wrong and devious
behavior).66 The propensity to freely cross the boundary between the public
and private spheres may be ascribed to the fact that, in the Chinese milieu,
the former often encroaches on the latter.67
The public side of the images floated has had three notable
characteristics.68 First, stress has traditionally been laid on the use of power
or authority for private ends and the use of public resources to manufacture
private ones rather than the abuse or misuse inevitably manifesting itself in
the course of such pursuits.69 This broad-based portrayal has both advantages
and disadvantages.70 On the one hand, it allows the widening of the net when
targeting corrupt practices and thus can be said to introduce an inherently
strict test for assessing potential transgressions.71 On the other hand, the

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See generally PEI, supra note 19.
Id. at 7.
Id.
See generally KAREN DAWISHA, PUTIN’S KLEPTOCRACY: WHO OWNS RUSSIA? (2014).
See KWONG, supra, note 57, at 3-5.
See id. at 3.
See id.
See id. at 3-5.
See He, supra, note 38, at 244.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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ambiguity pervading the depictions paves the way for possible manipulation
by officials in a position to exploit the terminological elasticity.72
Second, similar fuzziness has marked the notion of “private interest.”73
Again, this may be attributed to China’s collectivist or socialist legacy,
which has led to a convergence of and overlapping between the public and
private domains, with the former typically emitting stronger impulses and
exerting greater influence over policy outcomes.74 Private in this
unconventional, if viewed from a narrow Western or liberal perspective,75
institutional context extends well beyond the sector of social life generally
unimpeded by interventions from governmental and other public
organizations in that it includes various collective entities as well, both small
(e.g., work unit) and large (e.g., entire province).76
Third, the inclination to paint the picture with a broad brush has been
noted with regard to the delineation of the specific source or subject of
corruption.77 A wide range of scenarios may be conjured up.78 In the public
realm, an official, whether serving or retired, may be zeroed in on but so may
be her/his relatives, or even a whole public body and its leaders, to cite just
the most obvious examples.79 Once more, this may be looked at from a
favorable or unfavorable angle.80 Those charged with combating corruption
enjoy considerable leeway in executing their task, but they may readily abuse
their authority.81
Ideational opaqueness is amply observed at grassroots level, a pattern
evocatively mirrored in the popular literature.82 In daily parlance, corruption,
as grasped by Chinese people, is thus equated “not just [with] particular
codifiable transgressions, but also to broad, even metaphoric perceived
deficiencies of character, society, and history.”83 This stands in marked
contrast to “social science approaches [which] generally detail behaviors
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id.
See id.
See KWONG, supra note 57, at 3-5.
See generally RAYMOND GEUSS, PUBLIC GOODS, PRIVATE GOODS (2003).
See He, supra, note 38, at 244.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See generally JEFFREY C. KINKLEY, CORRUTION AND SOCIALISM IN LATE SOCIALIST
CHINA: THE RETURN OF THE POLITICAL NOVEL (2007).
83. Id. at 171.
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considered corrupt, the norms (laws, rules, or simply expectations) these
behaviors defy, and how and why this defiance persists.”84 The prevailing
tendency is to address corruption in nonutilitarian terms, as “an evil in
itself”:85 “Unfairness, injustice, and the slowing of economic growth may be
immanent with corruption, but corruption is not to be condemned simply
because of its consequences.”86
Interestingly, while corrupt practices are regarded at this level as an
elastic and evolving phenomenon, rather than a readily codifiable set of
transgressions,87 and one possessing a dynamic quality which renders it
mutable,88 cognitive reorientations across space and over time are not
random but engendered by sociopolitical transformations.89 A notable aspect
of the process is the heightened sensitivity to the concentration of power.90
Consequently, although “[o]utright calls for democracy are few and far
between, … ‘excessive’ power is coming to be seen as ‘corruption.’”91 The
inference tentatively drawn is that this “may someday threaten the
Communist Party.”92
At the elite level, deemed paramount for fruitful investigation of
Chinese corruption, the focus is on inappropriate dealings between resource
holders in the public and private sectors, which underlie a system of crony
capitalism.93 A salient feature of corruption in China thus is a deeply
ingrained “collusion among elites.”94 The emphasis placed on this
characterization stems from the fact that “such collusion, both legal and
illicit, lies at the heart of crony capitalism in all societies regardless of the
nature of their political regimes.”95 Such attribution of relative importance
does not necessarily imply that “petty corruption,” consisting “primarily of
the small bribes and informal fees incurred by individual citizens as they go

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 170.
Id. at 171.
Id.
See id. at 3.
See id. at 3, 171-172.
See id.
See id at 3.
Id.
Id.
See generally PEI, supra note 19.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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about their normal activities,”96 is a marginal phenomenon lacking serious
ramifications.97
The distinction between collusive corruption and its petty counterpart
is not trivial, however. The former is “more destructive than [the latter]
because such behavior destroys the organizational and normative fabric of
the [S]tate, increases the difficulty of detection, and produces greater
financial gains for perpetrators.”98 Additionally, “[d]ue to the greater
predatory capabilities possessed by elites engaged in collusive corruption,
local governments penetrated by these elites unavoidably experience
degradation in their capacity for providing public goods.”99 Indeed, the
impact of cross-sector elite collusion may be so profoundly corrosive that
“corruption networks, consisting of officials, businessmen, and gangsters,
[may] seize control of these jurisdictions and turn them into local mafia
[S]tates.”100
Another pernicious by-product of collusive corruption is believed to be
friction between State and society.101 Where collusive elites are perceived to
blatantly, persistently, and widely abuse their power, grassroots resentment
may build up and boil over.102 The absence of institutional channels to
facilitate an orderly and productive expression of such sentiment may
exacerbate the sense of alienation and frustration, culminating in acts of
violence and unruly protest.103 China’s State machinery has proved capable
of containing bottom-up threats to its rule, but they potentially sow the seeds
of social instability and undermine effective governance.104
Collusive corruption is not an exclusive Chinese behavioral pattern. In
Asia, it has commonly taken the form of “developmental corruption.”105 The
latter, in turn, has constituted an integral part of an institutional constellation
referred to as the “developmental State,” which has played a pivotal role in
the industrialization of the Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese economies.106
96. JONATHAN R. STROMSETH ET AL., CHINA’S GOVERNANCE PUZZLE: ENABLING
TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION IN A SINGLE-PARTY STATE 64 (2017).
97. See id.
98. PEI, supra note 19, at 9.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See Wedemen, supra note 58, at 15-51.
106. See id.
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These three remarkable transformational experiences have “rested on a
foundation of old-fashioned machine politics.”107 Collusion between
resource holders in the public and private sectors at similar historical
junctures has of course been a nearly universal phenomenon,108 but in Asia
it has exhibited its own distinct attributes:
Business provided the political resources (mostly money)
that allowed conservative, pro-business political leaders to build
stable political coalitions by binding together what would
otherwise have been a series of rival and often hostile factions,
each more interested in power than policy per se. Using funds
obtained from the business sector, the “big bosses” provided
factional leaders with a monetary buy-in. The factional bosses, in
turn, doled out funds to rank-and-file politicians who used the
money to fund local “constituent organizations,” pay community
organizers to mobilize voters, and ultimately, if necessary, to buy
the votes needed to win elections and thereby ensure conservative
control of government. Control of government enabled the ruling
coalition to harness [S]tate policies to the goal of consolidating its
grip on power and repaying its business supporters with a
combination of “public goods” in the form of broadly probusiness macroeconomic policies; ‘private goods’ in the form of
government subsidies, tax breaks, government contracts, and
rents; and pork-barrel spending aimed toward its supporters at
large. The new result was a pro-business system of redistributive
politics that drew its sustenance from both business profits and
government revenues.109
The Chinese configuration of collusive corruption poses an analytical
challenge in that it does not neatly fit into this institutional model,110 which
has transactive (consisting of inter-sectoral exchanges) and redistributive
(entailing the deployment and allocation of resources for political purposes)
elements inherently attractive to the two sides to the deal: Politicians benefit
by holding onto power and business groups enjoy a healthy stream of

107. Id. at 17.
108. See, e.g., TERRY GOLWAY, MACHINE MADE: TAMMANY HALL AND THE CREATION OF
MODERN AMERICAN POLITICS (2014).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 52-79.
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profits.111 This Faustian bargain with the devil of corruption takes its toll on
third parties, notably the consuming public, and may reasonably be regarded
as a type of organized crime “wherein the political mafioso extort a
percentage of the profits of legitimate—and illegitimate—businesses in
exchange for enacting pro-business policy … regimes.”112 Yet, it lends
stability to the system and stimulates economic growth.113 China, on the
other hand, appears to have been plagued by a “degenerative” variant of
corruption, which:
more closely resembles a mugging or a liquor store stickup
because it involves much higher levels of what has been termed,
awkwardly perhaps, “auto-corruption” and one way flow of
“plunder.” Developmental corruption is thus parasitical in that the
political machine sucks its sustenance from an economy but does
not necessarily intend to kill its economic host. Degenerative
corruption, by contrast, is predatory in that it feeds directly on an
economy and its vitals. Both may do considerable harm, but
degenerative corruption is much more likely to prove fatal and
manifest its worse effects more quickly.114
Elite-level collusion, even if exhibiting manifestations of symptomatic
degeneration, is not necessarily associated with cognitive coherence, let
alone cohesive and friction-free action.115 An interesting distinction in the
Chinese context is that between the attitudes toward corruption of liberals
and conservatives.116 The former are inclined to adopt a narrower
perspective, somewhat closer to the definitions found in Western academic
literature, but the latter tend to range more widely in their search for meaning
and equate corrupt practices with those that violate the moral conventions of
the community-at-large.117 The abuse of public office is thus not confined to

111. See id. at 52-53.
112. Id. at 53.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. See generally JING HUANG, FACTIONALISM IN CHINESE POLITICS (2006); Jiangnan
Zhu & Dong Zhan, Weapons of the Powerful: Authoritarian Elite Competition and Politicized
Anticorruption in China, 50 COMP. POL. STUD. 1186 (2017).
116. See generally Yun Sun, The Politics of Conceptualizing Corruption in Reform China,
35 CRIM. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245 (2001).
117. See id. at 248.
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public office holders’ pursuit of private gain and entails undermining the
general interests of society (zhengge shehui liyi).118
It should be noted that such perceptual divergences are not ineluctably
reflected in prevailing sociopolitical realities.119 Indeed, there is empirical
evidence to suggest that China’s more liberal regions have embraced a more
progressive stance toward corruption than conservative ones and have
enjoyed greater success in tackling the problem.120 An interesting contrast in
this respect is that between the “Guangdong” and “Chongqing models.”121
The market-oriented and outward-looking southern province of Guangdong
has fared far better in grappling with corruption than the collectivistically
inspired and inward-looking megacity of Chongqing and the adjacent
Sichuan province.122
Reform-era Chinese grasp of corrupt practices thus displays partial
convergence with Western academic conceptions at the fundamental
academic level, sufficiently so for undertaking systematic comparisons and
endeavoring to construct a unified theoretical framework.123 This crossing
of analytical pathways, however, promptly gives way to pronounced
divergences for cultural and structural reasons. Ambiguity, blurring of the
boundary between the public and private spheres, elasticity, fluidity, and
incongruities between the cognitive and behavioral components of the
attitudinal fabric pervade daily and policy discourse. Degenerative features
of corruption are witnessed on a scale seldom observed elsewhere, partly
accounting for the overarching priority accorded to the campaign presently
waged to alleviate them.
III. Variety of Chinese Corrupt Practices
A complex phenomenon observed in a diverse sociopolitical setting,
such as corruption in a country of China’s size and multifaceted character,
inevitably encompasses a broad range of activities, in this case nefarious in
nature. As indicated previously, juxtaposition of elite-level corrupt practices
118. See id.
119. See generally STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 96; Bin Gong & Benno Torgler, Causes
of Corruption: Evidences from China (Center for Research in Economics, Management and
the Arts, Working Paper No. 2010-07), http://www.crema-research.ch/papers/2010-07.pdf.
120. See Gong & Torgler, supra note 119.
121. See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 96, at 97.
122. See id.
123. See generally Gong & Scott eds., supra note 38; Leslie Holmes, Combating
Corruption in China: The Role of the State and Other Agencies in Comparative Perspective,
3 ECON. & POL. STUD. 42 (2015).
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with those seen at grassroots level paves the way for a fruitful distinction
between collusive corruption and its petty counterpart. Besides enhancing
conceptual clarity, such a dichotomy possesses considerable practical value
because it may serve as a basis for allocating scarce resources to a behavioral
pattern that has more pernicious consequences. Different strategies may also
be resorted to in confronting the two problems.
A simple typology cannot capture, however, the intricacies of Chinese
corrupt activities. For this reason, other classificatory schemes, often more
nuanced, have been proposed.124 Some authors confine themselves to merely
specifying the forms of corruption witnessed in China. The following
detailed list belongs to this category: taking bribes or embezzling State funds
and properties; obtaining benefits for dependents, relatives, and friends in
processes related to recruitment, school admission, job assignment,
determining cadre status, securing an exit permit, and admission to the CCP;
neglecting one’s duties and thereby causing economic damage; facilitating
access to key official positions for trusted followers; underperforming at
work, dodging responsibility, and blaming others; behaving arbitrarily,
retaliating, and fabricating evidence against others; producing false reports,
being boastful, and tending to exaggerate; using public funds for gift-giving
and paying for banquets; operating businesses and profiteering; taking
advantage of one’s authority to build or occupy property; living
extravagantly; entering into inappropriate sexual relationships; forming
cliques to further one’s interests; gambling and paying for sex; spending
lavishly on marriage and funeral ceremonies; giving expression to
superstitious beliefs; participating in smuggling; and selling State secrets.125
Such mechanically compiled listings have been superseded by
analytically underpinned classificatory schemes, either comprehensive or
selective in scope.126 Among the former, Sun’s phenomenology of reformera corruption stands out.127 It includes ten types of cadre corruption—
embezzlement (tanwu), bribe taking (shouhui), misappropriation (nuoyong),
squandering (huihuo langfei), privilege seeking (yiquan mousi), illegal
earnings (feifa shouru), negligence (duzhi), illegal profiteering (touji daoba),
violation of accounting procedures (weifan caijing jilu), and moral

124. See in particular TING GONG, THE POLITICS OF CORRUPTION IN CONTEMPORARY
CHINA: AN ANALYSIS OF POLICY OUTCOMES 7-11 (1994); MELANIE MANION, CORRUPTION BY
DESIGN 96-110 (2004); YAN SUN, CORRUPTION AND MARKET IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 2642, 53-191 (2004).
125. See GONG, supra note 124, at 9.
126. See MANION, supra note 124; SUN, supra note 124.
127. See SUN, supra note 124, at 26-42.
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decadence (daode duoluo)—and four other types of misconduct—violation
of family planning policies, violation of diplomatic codes, disclosure of
classified information, and deserting overseas posts.128
Some of these categories are subdivided further: negligence into theft
through contract, theft through payment fraud, theft through receipt fraud,
theft through managerial fraud, and theft through property transfer; bribe
taking into commission payments, salaries and bonuses, loans, purchase,
reimbursements, product trials; and special occasion gifts; misappropriation
into loans for commercial use, either legal (business, stocks, and other uses)
or illegal (smuggling, drug trafficking, substandard manufacturing,
unlicensed business, and the like), and diversion of designated funds;
squandering into feasting, gift giving, sightseeing, and luxury amenities;
privilege seeking into allocating regulated goods to relatives and friends and
paying private tuition; negligence into that observed in business ventures and
deals and that seen in supervision and regulation; illegal profiteering into that
involving State-regulated goods, State-regulated permits, and illegal
products and schemes; violation of accounting procedures into retention of
revenues due to the State; cheating the State out of financial allocation,
subsidies, and other allowances; illicit use and extraction of public funds;
changing the nature of State assets, price hiking, and illegitimate increase of
wages, bonuses, and subsidies; and moral decadence into patronizing
prostitutes and sheltering mistresses.129
While this careful and detailed account is not devoid of ambiguities,
reflecting the elasticity and fluidity of daily and policy discourse, it is marked
by a reasonable degree of notional precision and structural coherence. These
qualities are enhanced by constructing a four-dimensional typology and
locating the corrupt practices identified within that framework.130 The
dimensions consist of the nature of the actor (organizational versus
individual) and three categories of activities: essential/non-public,
nonessential/public, and mixed/mixed.131 For instance, bribery offenses may
be committed by either an organization or an individual and are classified as
essential/nonpublic; accounting violations originate in the organizational
realm and are deemed nonessential/public; embezzlement falls into the
individual and nonessential/public space; illegal income may be earned by
either an organization or an individual and is considered mixed/mixed; and

128.
129.
130.
131.

See id. at 27.
See id. at 27-33.
See id. at 36.
See id.
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moral decadence is a product of individual behavior possessing mixed/mixed
attributes.132
Sun has also followed the selective route by focusing on corrupt
practices as either two-way exchanges or transactions between concrete
individuals or institutions and nonexchanges or nontransactions where the
interactive element is absent.133 A quintessentially transactional-style
corruption thus involves individuals such as officials and citizens.134 In the
institutional sphere, the players participating in the quasi-exchanges or
quasi-transactions are the State and localities and the State and officials.135
A fundamentally nonexchange or nontransactional type of corrupt practices
is that featuring officials and the public coffer.136 This is a narrow-based
classificatory scheme, but it can comfortably accommodate the several
micro-level behavioral patterns pinpointed above.137
Another context-sensitive selective taxonomy of corruption has been
proposed by Mannon.138 She has opted to single out bureaucratic commerce,
which “refers to the business activities of companies created by the party and
government departments, including law enforcement agencies, in the 1980s
and early 1990s for the purpose of generating profits”;139 predatory
exactions, which “refers to excessive compulsory and irregular tax charges
exacted mainly from peasants by county and township governments, local
government agencies, and village authorities in the wake of
decollectivization in the 1980s”;140 corrupt exchanges, equated with and
“often prosecuted as bribery or illegal commissions”;141 public funds as
private capital, a form of financial corruption, entailing “the
misappropriation of public funds as interest-free capital for private
investment”;142 and illegal privatization of State-enterprise assets.143
Besides such attempts to impose a modicum of structure on the plethora
of Chinese corrupt practices sprouting in the public domain, there have been
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See id.
See id. at 158-159.
See id. at 68.
See id. at 120.
See id. at 87.
See id. at 53-191.
See MANION, supra note 124.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 106.
See id. at 107-110.
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efforts to identify and capture the essence of private sector corruption.144 The
studies exploring this side of the picture have shed meaningful light on
system-wide constellations and dynamics, as well as specific corrupt
activities and their ramifications. The volume and diversity have not been
sufficiently large, however, to enable proper aggregation and differentiation.
Valuable insights have been produced at the macro and micro levels, but
without laying a foundation for constructing a composite portrait.
As outlined above, the public sector has been subjected to a more
elaborate and richer examination in the process of seeking classificatory
order. The definitional ambiguity pinpointed in the previous section has been
reduced rather than eliminated. By the same token, the categories indicated
at times overlap and are not readily amenable to operationalization.
Nevertheless, a nuanced understanding emerges of an intricate phenomenon
in a country where the public sector continues to overshadow its private

144. See, e.g., Linfen J. Hwang & Robin S. Snell, Turnaround, Corruption, and
Mediocrity: Leadership and Governance in Three State-Owned Enterprises in Mainland
China, 43 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 111 (2003); Yuanyuan Wang & Jing Yu, Corruption and Firm
Growth: Evidence from China, 23 CHINA ECON. REV. 415 (2012); Li Dang & Ruilong Yang,
Anti-Corruption, Marketisation and Firm Behaviours: Evidence from Firm Innovation in
China, 4 ECON. & POL. STUD. 39 (2016); CHEN LIN ET AL., ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS
AND SHAREHOLDER VALUATIONS: EVENT STUDY EVIDENCE FROM CHINA (2016); Melanie
Manion, Taking China’s Anticorruption Campaign Seriously, 4 J. OF ECON. & POL. STUD. 3
(2016); Huihua Nie, Chen Li, & Chaofan Ma, Why Chinese Anti-Corruption Has Not Yet
Promoted Growth, 5 J. OF SOCIALOMICS 1 (2016); HUIHUA NIE, COLLUSION, LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA (2017); Haoyuan Ding ET AL., Equilibrium
Consequences of Corruption on Firms: Evidence from China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign
(July 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/web.sas.upenn.
edu/dist/3/517/files/2018/11/Draft_July_25_2017-1jfifzg.pdf; Bin Dong & Benno Torgler,
The Consequences of Corruption: Evidences from China, (FEEM, Working Paper No.
73.2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1628567; Mariassunta Gianntti &
Xiaoyun Yu, The Impact of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign on Small and Incumbent
Firms in China, GLOBAL BUSINESS OUTLOOK, http://www.globalbusinessoutlook.com/theimpact-of-xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-campaign-on-small-and-incumbent-firms-in-china/
(last visited Feb. 3, 2020); Bo Li, Zhengwei Wang, & Hao Zhou, China’s Corruption
Campaign and Credit Reallocation to Non-SOEs (Aug. 2017), http://gcfp.mit.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/Li-Wang-Zhou.pdf; Jianwei Shi et al., Moving towards a Better
Path? A Mixed-Method Examination of China’s Reforms to Remedy Medical Corruption from
Pharmaceutical Firms, BMJ JOURNALS (Feb. 8, 2018), http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/8/2/
e018513; Andrew Wedeman, Growth and Corruption in China, CHINA RESEARCH CENTER
(Dec. 30, 2012), https://www.chinacenter.net/2012/china_currents/11-2/growth-and-corrupti
on-in-china/; Joe Zhang, Private Sector Corruption with Chinese Characteristics, FINANCIAL
TIMES, https://www.ft.com/content/ec7d6c62-2147-11e4-a958-00144feabdc0.
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sector counterpart in many crucial respects, and increasingly so, despite
possible expectations to the contrary.145
IV. Roots of Chinese Corruption
The dominant view of the origins of present-day corrupt practices in
China revolves around the partial post-1978 marketization of the economy,
an incomplete process characterized by twists and turns, but which has
progressed sufficiently to substantially reshape the sociopolitical
landscape.146 A notable by-product of the “halfway house”-style institutional
configuration that has resulted from the hesitant shift from State to market
has been a dual structure liberally accommodating elements of both pre- and
post-reform era organizational legacies and initiatives.147 Within this strewnwith-contradictions façade, State-controlled and market-driven entities have
been provided with ample space to comfortably but problematically
coexist.148
A conspicuous example had been dual-track pricing, which had long
featured State-determined and market-shaped prices of commodities, interest
rates charged on bank loans, import duties, and land lease fees.149 Another
similar pattern had persistently involved reliance on a dual system of Stateinfluenced and market-propelled distribution of resources, paving the way
for “preferential” fiscal, monetary, and regulatory treatment of certain

145. See Nectar Gan, Xi Jinping Thought—The Communist Party’s Tighter Grip on
China’s in 16 Characters, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 25, 2017), http://www.
scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2116836/xi-jinping-thought-communist-part
ys-tighter-grip-china.
146. See generally KWONG, supra note 57; GONG, supra note 124; MANION, supra note
124; SUN, supra note 124; Wedeman, supra note 58; PEI, supra note 19; Jiangnan Zhu,
Corruption Networks in China: An Institutional Analysis, in Gong and Scott eds., supra note
38, 27; Alan P. L. Liu, The Politics of Corruption in the People’s Republic of China, 77 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 602 (1983); XIAOBO LU, CADRES AND CORRUPTION: THE ORGANIZATIONAL
INVOLUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (2000); Wenhao Cheng, An Empirical Study
of Corruption within China’s State-owned Enterprises, 4 CHINA REV. 55 (2004); Xin Chen,
The Reform Discourse and China’s War on Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE IN
ASIA 39 (Nicholas Tarling ed., 2005); Jon S. T. Quah, Minimizing Corruption in China: Is
This an Impossible Dream?, 4 MD. SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. 1 (2013); Weijia Li,
Gerard Roland, & Yang Xie, Crony Capitalism, the Party-State, and Political Boundaries of
Corruption (May 15, 2018), http://cesi.econ.cuhk.edu.hk/wp-content/uploads/Xie-Yang_Cr
ony-Capitalism-the-Party-State-and-Political-Boundaries-of-Corruption.pdf.
147. See Chen, supra note 146, at 42.
148. See id.
149. See id.

2 - Mushkat_HICLR_V43-2 (Do Not Delete)

Summer 2020]

Combatting Corruption in the “Era of Xi Junping”

5/1/2020 4:08 PM

157

regions, industries, and individual enterprises.150 This bipolar institutional
constellation is thought to have offered considerable scope for government
agencies and public officeholders to trade their allocation power over State
controls for private benefits by taking advantage of the premium paid for
goods and services, over prices prevailing in the State-managed segment of
the economy, by players operating in the free marketplace.151
Other key pockets of activity within this two-dimensional hybrid
organizational structure replete with opportunities to derive “economic
rents” have included the administrative examination and approval
machinery, oversight of public investment funds, and government
spending.152 The first of these procedural mechanisms pertains to a host of
overly elaborate approval processes employed by central ministries and/or
their subnational branches in evaluating project proposals originating in
various sectors and industries.153 Their complex nature, coupled with poor
transparency, has turned them into a breeding ground for corruption.154 By
the same token, public investment and government spending decisions have
tended to assume the form of administrative fiat, furnishing “rent-seekers”
with an abundant room “to cut kick-back deals with those competing for
shares of the ‘pork barrel,’ which are usually lucrative and risk-free.”155
“Rent-seeking” in the highly sensitive judicial and law enforcement
realm has had particularly deleterious effects because of the high likelihood
of it gradually but irrevocably mutating into pernicious and stubborn crime
and the heavy financial costs foisted on the State.156 Examples commonly
invoked to illustrate the gravity of corrupt practices in this specific sphere
highlight the socioeconomic harm wrought by customs officers, policemen,
and tax collectors who work with criminals in money laundering, drug
trafficking, smuggling, prostitution, producing and selling forgeries, or
cooking the books for tax or import duty evasions.157

150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id. See also Quah, supra note 146, at 47-50.
155. Chen, supra note 146; see also RENT SEEKING IN CHINA (Tak-Wing Ngo & Yongping
Wu eds., 2009).
156. See Chen, supra note 146, at 41.
157. Id. See also Ting Gong, Dependent Judiciary and Unaccountable Judges: Judicial
Corruption in Contemporary China, 4 CHINA REV. 33 (2004); Elaine Jeffrey, Exposing Police
Corruption and Malfeasance: China’s Virgin Prostitute Cases, 63 CHINA J. 127 (2010); Ling
Li, The ‘Production’ of Corruption in China’s Courts—The Politics of Judicial Decision-
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Manifestations of economic dualism, and ensuing corrupt practices,
have abounded at the subnational level, especially in intricate township
milieus.158 Townships have been small cities whose vibrancy has enabled
them to absorb a substantial portion of the surplus labor that has migrated
from the countryside to urban areas following the dissolution of rural
communes in the early 1980s.159 Township and village enterprises (TVEs)
have been the most robust segment of the Chinese economy during much of
the reform era, a source of positive impulses facilitating economic
advancement throughout the entire system.160 While formally defined as
“collectives,” TVEs have been the creation of the township governments,
who have exercised close control over their financial, human resource,
marketing, and planning activities.161
Consequently, strategically positioned public officeholders have
doubled as dedicated entrepreneurs.162 There has also ineluctably been
extensive government interference in all business domains, with enterprises
deprived of property rights necessary to shield them from exogenous
intrusions.163 The officials-cum-entrepreneurs have unequivocally embraced
the goals of their commercial counterparts, which could be best pursued by
relentlessly seeking high-octane economic growth.164 The inevitable upshot
of this unique variant of “local corporatism” has been the cartelization and
capture by private interests of public institutions, including those performing
regulatory functions, driving the economy forward but fueling corruption.165
The heavy concentration of power in a geographically and functionally
fragmented authoritarian governance regime has aggravated the problem.166
On the one hand, the politico-bureaucratic elite has continued to play a
pivotal role in guiding the transition from State to market, maintaining
control over the commanding heights of the bipolar economic structure and
converting its access to vast pool of resources into a vehicle for gaining
Making and Its Consequences in a One-Party State, 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 848 (2012); Yuhua
Wang, Court Funding and Judicial Corruption in China, 69 CHINA J. 43 (2013).
158. See generally Peter Ping Li, The Puzzle of China’s Township-Village Enterprises:
The Paradox of Local Corporatism and Dual-Track Economic Transition, 1 MANAGEMENT
& ORG. REV. 197 (2005).
159. See id. at 199.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 200-201
162. See id. at 198.
163. See id. at 202-203.
164. See id. at 206.
165. See id. at 206-209.
166. See Zhu, supra note 146, at 32-34.
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personal advantage.167 On the other hand, the overall governance architecture
has become increasingly fractured, allowing subnational units, particularly
in relatively affluent coastal regions, to operate freely: “With such wideranging responsibilities, little oversight and lack of accountability in an
authoritarian [S]tate deeply influenced by cultural ideas such as guanxi,
provincial leaders and those close to them can more easily use their positions
to develop large corruption networks.”168
Command over massive resources should not be equated with adequate
official compensation. Indeed, poor pay, in addition to eroding employee
morale and motivation, as well as sustaining a steady exodus to the private
sector, is believed to have contributed to the proliferation of corrupt practices
in China, in the past and at present.169 Public employees’ salaries have
gradually been increased, both in nominal and real terms, but not to a point
of alleviating the problem.170 The material benefits potentially obtained by
means of untoward activities exceed them by a large margin. The improved
compensation has thus been derided as “nothing compared to what officials
can put in their pockets through corruption,”171 falling far short of what might
be needed “to stop them.”172
Corrupt activities, of course, do not necessarily go unpunished,
inflicting a possible cost on those who engage in them and serving as a likely
deterrent.173 The effectiveness of harsh responses to this type of crime has
been firmly demonstrated in the Hong Kong and Singapore context.174 By
the same token, the adverse implications of a lackadaisical policy stance in
this respect have been vividly witnessed in India, Indonesia, and the
Philippines.175 For the most part, the Chinese experience has been consistent
with patterns observed in these three industrializing and populous Asian
countries.176 The probability of detection and punishment has been

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See id. at 33-34.
Id. at 33.
See Quah, supra note 146, at 41-47.
See id. at 45-46.
Id.
Id. at 46.
See id. at 50-52.
See id. at 50-51.
See id.
See id.
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traditionally low.177 Moreover, those actually exposed have seldom paid a
hefty price for their transgressions.178
Institutional accounts, often grounded in economic logic, may convey
the impression that rampant corruption in China is a contemporary
phenomenon, neatly traced to the opening up of a previously hermetically
closed and static economy, which has not undergone wholesale restructuring
over a lengthy period and which is consequently saddled with imbalances
rendering it vulnerable to an array of corrupt practices. Alternatively, if a
longer time horizon is adopted for this purpose, that Chinese corruption is
the sole product of organizational patterns, and corresponding incentive
configurations, underlying an evolving governance regime. Cultural heritage
has been invoked to complement this possibly narrow perspective.179
The influence of guanxi and the tradition of gift-giving have featured
prominently in explanatory schemes laying emphasis on this factor, because
of their indisputable role in conditioning individuals to give and receive
bribes.180 It has thus been noted that “[a]part from promoting reciprocity in
social relations, gift-giving also encourages bribery among civil servants,
who accept gifts provided by businessmen wishing to cut red tape or to
obtain licenses or permits improperly.”181 Six commonly observed potential
bases for guanxi have been identified: “locality or dialect; fictive kinship
(persons with the same surname); kinship; workplace; trade associations or
social clubs; and friendship.”182
The prevalence of informal politics, another variable in the corruption
equation, may also be attributed to cultural legacy.183 Specifically, “[i]n
China today as in the past, neither a legal system, nor a moral order can fully
regulate the behavior of officials.”184 The corollary is that “informal politics
becomes a convenient tool for political elites to secure power and gain

177. See id. at 50-52.
178. See id.
179. See Chen, supra note 146, 41; Quah, supra note 146, at 56-58; Zhu, supra note 146,
at 34-36. See also Winnie Tong, Analysis of Corruption from Sociocultural Perspectives, 5
INT’L J. OF BUS. & SOC. SCI. 9 (2014); Peng Wang, Military Corruption in China: The Role of
Guangxi in the Buying and Selling of Military Positions, 228 CHINA Q. 970 (2016); Tony C.
Lee, Pernicious Custom? Corruption, Culture, and the Efficacy of Anti-Corruption
Campaigning in China, 70 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 349 (2018).
180. See Quah, supra note 146, at 56.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 56-57.
183. See Zhu, supra note 146, at 34-36.
184. Id. at 34.
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protection.”185 It stands in contrast to formal politics, “which adheres to
bureaucratic procedure and policies based on institutional interests and
policy preferences, [by virtue of entailing] loyalty towards individuals, while
fixed procedures and policies are usually absent.”186 The ineluctable
inference is that “informal politics is naturally conducive to corruption.”187
The impulses originating in this space are assumed to be transmitted via
three interrelated channels.188 First, deeply entrenched factionalism “permits
groups to emerge, bound by shared background, intertwined careers and
bureaucratic responsibilities, and loyalties to their leaders, [and then] seek
… benefits for their members.”189 Second, due to the persistence and
resilience of informal power structures, “corruption networks can be
extended as the faction itself expands.”190 Third, given the ubiquity of
informal politics, “family members of government officials often become
involved in a leader’s political network, leading to the privatization of public
power.”191
A number of additional factors are believed to have contributed to the
pervasiveness of corrupt activities in Chinese society throughout history.192
The sheer size of the country, climatic variations experienced, harsh terrain,
inadequate communication and transportation infrastructure, linguistic
diversity, and interethnic animosity have detracted from the effectiveness
and anticorruption endeavors, whatever their form.193 Susceptibility to
natural disasters has compounded the problem by throwing up plentiful
opportunities for private gain for public officials engaged in implementation
of humanitarian relief operations during and after the physical disruption.194
To complicate matters, financially intensive infrastructure enhancements,
ripe for exploitation, have been handled, subject to few constraints, by
government officials and related parties.195
Some of these analytical accounts have been enriched with theoretical
insights. Notably, the modernization paradigm, also known as “revisionist”
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 34-36.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id.
See Quah, supra note 146, at 10-12.
See id. at 10-11.
See id. at 10.
See id. at 12.
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and “structural-functionalist,” has been resorted to in order to strip
corruption of its moral connotations and place it in an appropriate
developmental context.196 Within this conceptual framework, corrupt
practices are the inevitable by-product of the modernization process, and
vanish or, more correctly, diminish when economic development enters a
mature phase, characterized by a high degree of institutional deepening and
strong rule of law.197 It is further and controversially asserted that corruption
may even perform certain positive functions while modernization progresses
by filling gaps in the fragile politico-bureaucratic façade.198
Closely aligned with this developmental perspective, but less time
dependent, is the theoretical notion that corrupt activities are sustained by
innate bureaucratic pathologies.199 The underlying lofty vision may suggest
otherwise, but in practice, due to a fundamentally skewed incentive structure,
public organizations, although not devoid of channels for the expression of
altruistic motives, serve as convenient platforms for the pursuit of selfinterest.200 It is thus common for civil servants “to create informational
networks of friends, favor recipients, contracts, and communication links
based upon primarily personal, rather than official relationships with
others.”201 The extent to which such behavioral propensities exert palpable
influence hinges on the nature of institutional setting, which often reflects
evolutionary dynamics and remaking of the incentive structure.202
The rational choice model, while rooted in philosophy of economic
individualism, does not in fact diverge markedly from the above two
analytical schemes.203 The basic premise here is that corruption is the result
of deliberate choice—rather than, for example, unavoidable cultural
proclivity—whereby rational individuals weigh the advantages and
disadvantages of deviating from a prescribed path in an environment akin to
the marketplace.204 Two variables determine the outcome of the careful
deliberations: “a monopolistic condition on the side of the bureaucracy, and
a black market to benefit the profiteering activities of the bureaucracy.”205
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See Gong, supra note 124, at 15-17.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 18-19.
See id.
Id. at 19.
See id.
See id. at 17-18.
See id. at 17.
Id.
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The two elements are not necessarily in balance and, “[w]hen demand
outpaces supply, a black market in government services may surface.”206
In such circumstances, “market”-induced corrupt practices (largely
inspired by who pays the most) may override those of the “parochial” variety
(primarily motivated by family ties, group identity, personal feelings, and
the like) and are best designated as “rent-seeking.”207 Specific Malaysian
experience is relied upon in support of this proposition.208 It entails the use
of bureaucratic authority to allocate shares to Malay individuals.209 The
officials enjoying this power have been receiving a percentage of the
unearned rent in exchange for allotting the shares and deriving substantial
benefits in the process, partly passed on to members of their inner circle.210
The widespread incidence of corruption in China is thus attributed to
multiple causes, some structurally determined and some time-honored,
shaped by long waves of history and mostly independent of prevailing
institutional patterns and incentive constellations. Theoretical insights
selectively underpin the reasoning employed to enhance the validity of the
explanatory accounts offered, revealing a certain degree of complementarity,
rather than fundamentally irreconcilable differences, although this issue is
not comprehensively explored. The relative weight to be accorded to the
various causes in well-defined settings and the relationship between them
and strategies to eradicate corrupt activities is also left largely untouched.

V. Law and Economics Angle
The academic examination of legal phenomena, including those with
policy ramifications, which is typically the case, has evolved significantly in
the past seven decades.211 The doctrinal approach, which has traditionally
been the dominant investigative mode, has by no means been relegated to

206. Id.
207. See id. at 17-18.
208. See id. at 18.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Law and Social Sciences, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 171 (1997); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-First
Century, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. (2002).
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the analytical periphery.212 Interchangeably referred to as the “black-letterlaw” method, it continues to enjoy intellectual prominence, for the most part
overshadowing competing or complementary paradigms.213 Constructing
legal arguments with reference to statute law and judicial precedent remains
the principal pathway to legal discovery, particularly in the common law
context.214
The doctrinal approach derives its vitality from the unquestionably
strong connection with legal practice or the fact that it posits that scholarship
in the field emanates from the law itself.215 Researchers who follow this route
thus aim to elucidate, organize, and refine legal ideas and policies by
applying that logic to authoritative texts encompassing both primary and
secondary sources.216 The intimate relationship with the law as it is
confronted and managed in daily life means that the black-letter-method is
unlikely to be dethroned in the foreseeable future as the primary pedagogical
legal tool and perhaps even not as a crucial vehicle for ongoing knowledge
accumulation.217
That said, the academic law space has increasingly become inhabited
by contrasting approaches falling under the rubric of “socio-legal studies.”218
These methodological schemes have been impelled by a range of influences,
but a key role has been played by the growing perception that—if narrowly
conceived and solely relied upon—the doctrinal system may prove an overly
inflexible and restrictive way of dissecting the law and the operations of the
institutional machinery sustaining it.219 The broad set of socio-legal
perspectives shares the common goal of placing the entire law underpinned
governance regime in a multifaceted economic, political, and social context
and exploring it within a robust conceptual and empirical framework
embraced by positivistically inclined behavioral scientists.220

212. See generally Terry Hutchinson & Nigel J. Duncan, Defining and Describing What
We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research, 17 DEAKIN L. REV. 83 (2012).
213. See generally id.
214. See generally id.
215. See generally id.
216. See generally id.
217. See generally id.
218. See generally Macey, supra note 211; Blumenthal, supra note 211.
219. See generally Macey, supra note 211; Blumenthal, supra note 211.
220. See generally Macey, supra note 211; Blumenthal, supra note 211.
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Law and economics (LE), or economic analysis of law (EAL), occupies
a distinct segment of that space.221 It consists of the application of models
employed by scholars in the field of economics to issues predominantly
concerning students of law.222 The origins of LE lie in the Chicago School
of microeconomics.223 The bias toward microeconomic theory and method
continues to the present day, but it is less pronounced than in the past.224
Notably, institutional (including organizational) economists and their
behavioral counterparts have entered the realm of LE, pursuing divergent
paths from researchers drawing their inspiration exclusively from
microeconomics, particularly the neoclassical variant.225
Corrupt activities have been subjected to a systematic LE-style
examination since the late 1970s.226 As indicated previously, while this is not
221. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(2004); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (4th ed. 2011);
ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (6th ed. 2012); THOMAS J.
MICELLI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW (3d ed. 2017).
222. See generally SHAVELL, supra note 221; POLINSKY, supra note 221; COOTER & ULEN,
supra note 221; MICELLI, supra note 221.
223. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960);
Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499
(1961).
224. See generally Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD.
L. REV. 303 (2005).
225. See generally Richard A. Posner, The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and
Economics, 149 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 73 (1993); A. Alan Schmid,
Institutional Law and Economics, 1 EUROPEAN J.L. & ECON. 33 (1994); Christine Jolls, Cass
R. Sunstein, & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471 (1998); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000);
Geoffrey M. Hodgson & Shuxia Jiang, The Economics of Corruption and the Corruption of
Economics: An Institutional Perspective, 41 J. ECON. ISSUES 1043 (2007); CHRISTINE JOLLS,
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2007); Rudolf Richter, The Role of Law in the New
Institutional Economics, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 13 (2008); Richard A. Posner, From
the New Institutional Economics to Organization Economics: With Applications to Corporate
Governance, Government Agencies, and Legal Institutions, 6 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. (2010);
Wouter Ebben & Albert de Vaal, Institutions and the Relation between Corruption and
Economic Growth, 15 REV. DEV. ECON. 108 (2011); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychological
Foundations of Behavioral Law and Economics, U. ILL. L. REV. 1675 (2011); David Jancsics,
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Corruption, 8 SOCIOLOGY COMPASS 358 (2014); OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds.,
2014).
226. See generally Gong & Scott eds., supra note 38; SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN,
CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978); ROBIN THEOBALD, CORRUPTION,
DEVELOPMENT, AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1990); Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, The New
Economics of Corruption: A Survey and Some New Results, XLV POL. STUD. 496; MARK
ROBINSON, CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT (1998); GOVERNANCE CORRUPTION AND
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the sole analytical perspective that may be fruitfully brought to bear on that
complex phenomenon, in general and in specific sociopolitical milieus, it
possesses certain tangible advantages. Above all, whereas other conceptual
paradigms often focus on uncontrollable factors (e.g., climate, culture, ethnic
divisions, historical legacy, linguistic nuances, local identity, topography,
and the like) which policy makers cannot manipulate in the short-term and
even medium-term, LE is heavily geared toward the controllable side of the
problem management equation.227 Provided it exhibits awareness of
contextual intricacies shaping human behavior and does not follow
mechanically the neoclassical microeconomic route, it may productively
inform anticorruption strategies.
While rigid adherence to the rational choice model, firmly grounded in
neoclassical microeconomics, may unduly narrow the field of intellectual
vision, its theoretical and practical merits, accounting for its lingering
analytical appeal and only marginally diminished status as the foundation
stone of LE, should not be overlooked. It is disapprovingly claimed that, in
its basic form, the model reduces corrupt practices to the product of
interaction between atomized individuals who seek to maximize utility when

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (George T. Abed & Sanjeev Gupta eds., 2002); THE NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION (Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Mark Taube &
Matthias Schramm eds., 2004); CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE ANTI-CORRUPTION
CAMPAIGNS (Sarah Bracking ed., 2007); JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, THE INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND REFORM: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND POLICY (2007); JORGE
MARTINEZ-VASQUEZ, JAVIER ARZE DEL GRANDO, & JAMES BOEX, FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN
THE PUBLIC SECTOR (2007); LORENZO PELLEGRINI, CORRUPTION, DEVELOPMENT AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2011); Benjamin A. Olken & Rohini Pande, Corruption in Developing
Countries, 4 ANNUAL REV. ECON. 479 (2012); NEW ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
ON CORRUPTION (Danila Serra & Leonard Wantchekon eds., 2012); MARCO ARNONE &
LEONARDO S. BORLINI, CORRUPTION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014);
TINA SOREIDE & ALED WILLIAMS, CORRUPTION, GRABBING, AND DEVELOPMENT: REAL
WORLD CHALLENGES (2014); ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION (Paul M.
Heywood ed., 2015); CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Jayasri Dutta & Toke S.
Aidt eds., 2016); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN & BONNIE J. PALFIKA, CORRUPTION AND
GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (2d ed. 2016); VIKRAM VASHISHT,
CASH, CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT (2017); Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Preventing
Corruption by Promoting Trust—Insights from the Behavioral Science, https://www.resea
rchgate.net/profile/Johann_Lambsdorff/publication/286441815_Preventing_Corruption_by_
Promoting_Trust_-_Insights_from_Behavioral_Science/links/5669477108ae7dc22ad45197/
Preventing-Corruption-by-Promoting-Trust-Insights-from-Behavioral-Science.pdf (last
visited Aug. 31, 2019).
227. See generally Silvia Popescu, Controllable and Uncontrollable Variables in the
Study of Entrepreneurship, in Small and Medium Business, 3 INT’L REV. MANAGEMENT &
BUS. RESEARCH 762 (2014).
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engaged in exchanges under conditions of scarcity.228 Becoming embroiled
in corruption is thus a conscious process featuring careful weighing of costs
and benefits, ultimately culminating in corrupt behavior since it is consistent
with maximization of personal profit.229 This circumscribed approach is said
to conceptualize parties to an exchange as “atomized or ‘undersocialized’
actors who are minimally affected by social relations.”230 To put it
differently, corruption is akin to a two-player game, where an agent and
client operate in splendid isolation, with “their identities and past relations
… typically [deemed] neglected factors because they are thought to be
unimportant.”231
This is an outdated and overly simplistic characterization of the rational
choice model. It is now commonly acknowledged by the scheme’s advocates
that agents obtain utility from process as well as outcome.232 Moreover, the
traditional notion of a profit maximizing and self-oriented homo economicus
is increasingly complemented by constructs such as homo communicans
(who “engages in a search for the substantive ‘right’ by offering arguments
in public and by entering into a dialogue with other parties whose preferences
he/[she] hopes to alter through superior reasoning”),233 homo egualis (who
“is eager to reduce inequality”),234 homo parochius (who “consistently splits
the world into insiders and outsiders”),235 and homo reciporocans (who
“displays a propensity to cooperate and share with others who exhibit such
tendencies—even at a personal cost—and a willingness to take punitive
action against those who violate cooperative and complementary social
norms, even if this has adverse personal consequences”).236
As important is the relaxation of the assumption that seemingly
unfettered and omniscient agents possess full knowledge of the problems
they address and proceed to meticulously dissect them.237 To place the
restrictive proposition on a wider footing, adaptation-centered theories of
decision making, rooted in evolutionary biology and evolutionary
228. See Jancsics, supra note 225, at 359.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Roda Mushkat, International Legal Compliance as a Rational Act: Theoretical
Extensions and Chinese Realities, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 633, 640 (2012).
233. Id. at 640-641.
234. Id. at 641.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 644-649.
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psychology, disciplines that ascribe human physical and behavioral
configurations to cumulative responses to challenges facing humankind over
time, have been embraced.238 Neoclassical rationality has thus been
compelled to share the limelight with its bounded or ecological
counterpart.239 The latter is often associated with incrementalism, or path
dependence, and typically entails marginal rather than substantial departures
from the prevailing state of affairs, the corollary being that merely a handful
of options are explored at any juncture and selectively to boot.240
Behaviorally inclined LE scholars who focus on corruption are
particularly intrigued by the prevalence of manifestations of homo
reciprocans spirit and their policy ramifications.241 These patterns are, inter
alia, amply observed and strongly supported by scientific evidence
generated in sociopsychological experimental milieus, where it has been
shown that reciprocity plays a pivotal role in public goods and ultimatum
games.242 The inference drawn is that trust may be a potent force in enduring
social relationships, although not invariably and at times in the negative
sense of the term.243 For instance, on the positive side, social researchers
have demonstrated that trust may encourage cooperation in games in which
the Nash equilibrium is defection.244 In such situations, it is apparently
customary for participants to forgo the gains of (sudden) defection if there is
sufficient trust in the other actors’ willingness to cooperate.245
Interestingly, behaviorally oriented LE scholars have chosen to
highlight the negative aspects.246 Their empirically underpinned contention
is that the smooth execution of corrupt transactions hinges on maintenance
of a high degree of trust.247 The reason lies in the fact that corruption is an
intricate and potentially risky undertaking, which may easily unravel due to
betrayal and treachery.248 Those who become embroiled “in this business

238. See id. at 645-646.
239. See id. at 646-649.
240. See id. at 646.
241. See generally Johann Graff Lambsdorff, Behavioural and Institutional Economics as
an Inspiration to Anti-Corruption: Some Counterintuitive Findings, in Paul M. Heywood ed.,
supra note 226, 299.
242. See Mushkat, supra note 232, at 641.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See generally Lambsdorff, supra note 241.
248. See id. at 301.
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delve into a criminal sphere in which networks are as important as mutual
trust.”249 Paradoxically, the implication presumably is that “[l]ack of trust,
luckily, can deter corruption.”250
This leads to the suggestion that the frequency of bribes and similar
transgressions “can be reduced by rendering reciprocity uncertain, by
undermining the stability of corrupt transactions.”251 The objective is to
induce those involved in corruption “to cheat each other.”252 Two possible
strategies illustrate the underlying logic.253 One approach “would be to grant
leniency to any perpetrator, the briber or the bribe-taker, who can prove to
have cheated their counterpart.”254 Another option “would be to penalize
bribe-giving but not bribe taking [—the favorable consequence being] that
bribe-takers are free to cheat bribers, without fears of reprisals.”255
Such behaviorally derived insights have not relegated homo
economicus to the analytical periphery.256 The pursuit of material advantage
and self-interest remain a key element of the decision making equation,
softened at the edges by situational constraints and the type of preferences
exhibited by homo communicans, homo egualis, homo parochius, and homo
reciprocans, as well as agents’ capacity to reveal their other-regarding side
or propensity toward social rationality (“if a socially rational agent can
perform an action whose joint benefit—i.e., the benefits to the whole
group—is greater than its joint loss, [he or she] may select that action”).257
A somewhat shackled and tempered homo economicus may no longer be
perceived as an unbridled utility maximizer, but he/she is postulated to be
behaving reasonably from a microeconomic angle.258
The implication is that purely cognitive, or sociologically framed,
accounts of agent conduct are regarded as inconsistent with empirical
evidence because they are based on the premise that “[h]umans are not
evaluators any more than ants, bees, or termites are evaluators”259 and that
249. See id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 303.
252. Id. at 305.
253. See id. at 306.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See Mushkat, supra note 232, at 651.
257. Id.
258. See id.
259. MICHAEL C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY 22 (2001). See
also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Nature of Man, 7 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.
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people “are conventional and conformist, and their behavior is [solely]
determined by the taboos, customs, mores, and traditions of the society in
which they are born and raised.”260 Such essentially backward-looking
explanatory schemes are also deemed to be at variance with the principles of
the rule of law, which stipulate that agents should be held accountable for
their actions.261
There is thus good, albeit qualified, statistical support for rational
choice models of crime and, by extension, corrupt practices.262 The data
generally, although not uniformly, validate the time-honored assumption that
economic motives are a key determinant of participation in crime.263 The
picture conveyed is that, to a considerable extent, individuals do indeed
decide whether to engage in crime by performing something akin to costbenefit calculation under uncertainty.264 In the process, they assess, not
necessarily explicitly and formally, whether the anticipated benefits from
crime (netting out the probability of being caught) outweigh the anticipated
costs (normally expressed in terms of opportunity costs).265
Two factors are posited to exert meaningful influence in this context by
furnishing conflicting material incentives to agents.266 First, alternatives to
crime are believed to affect the likelihood of committing an unlawful act.267
The principal source of competing pressures is a person’s job, which
4 (1994); Michael C. Jensen, Self-Interest, Altruism, Incentives and Agency, 7 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 40 (1994).
260. See JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 259. See also
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 259; Jensen, Self-Interest, Altruism, Incentives and Agency,
supra note 259.
261. See Roda Mushkat, Greater China Constitutes Fertile Ground for ‘Building’ and
‘Testing’ Positive International Legal Theory, 20 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 354, 385
(2016).
262. See generally Steven D. Levitt & Thomas J. Miles, Empirical Study of Criminal
Punishment, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 453 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell eds., 2007); Mirko Draca & Stephen Machin, Crime and Economic Incentives, 7
ANNUAL REV. ECON. 398 (2015); Aaron Chaplin & Justin McCray, Criminal Deterrence: A
Review of the Literature, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5 (2017).
263. See generally Levitt & Miles, supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262;
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262.
264. See generally Levitt & Miles, supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262;
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262.
265. See generally Levitt & Miles, supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262;
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262.
266. See generally Levitt & Miles, supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262;
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262.
267. See generally Levitt & Miles, supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262;
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262.
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provides him/her with a certainty equivalent payoff from wages.268 It follows
that, if the wage available in the formal labor market is boosted, and all else
stays constant, participation in crime should decline.269 Second, returns to
crime are thought to pull agents in the opposite direction.270 Specifically, if
profits from crime are greater, or are perceived to be greater, then, again all
else being equal, participation in crime should rise.271
Both these pathways entail a direct impact of material incentives on
crime, including of the corrupt variety.272 The other transmission mechanism
which looms large in standard microeconomic models of crime is the
influence brought to bear on criminal behavior in the form of the indirect
incentive effect generated via the deterrence and incapacitation strategies of
the criminal justice system.273 Absent the presence of countervailing forces,
an increase in criminal sanctions and enhancement, qualitative as well as
quantitative, of criminal justice system capabilities should thus dampen
incentives to commit unlawful acts, and vice versa.274
In sum, rational choice models of crime (and corruption) postulate that,
ceteris paribus, participation in these types of activities (excluding
categories such as violent criminal behavior) is determined by a combination
of incentives and deterrence.275 To express it more elaborately, the
fundamental proposition is that increases in criminal earnings raise crime
and increases in legal wages, the probability of being caught (a function of
criminal justice system effectiveness), and the magnitude of sanction if
caught lower crime.276 The models can be refined by abandoning the
restrictive notion that the choice is binary, between legal work and its illicit
268. See generally Levitt & Miles,
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262.
269. See generally Levitt & Miles,
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262.
270. See generally Levitt & Miles,
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262.
271. See generally Levitt & Miles,
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262.
272. See generally Levitt & Miles,
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262.
273. See generally Levitt & Miles,
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262.
274. See generally Levitt & Miles,
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262.
275. See generally Levitt & Miles,
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262.
276. See generally Levitt & Miles,
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262.

supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262;
supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262;
supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262;
supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262;
supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262;
supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262;
supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262;
supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262;
supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262;
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counterpart, and turning this into a time-allocation problem, whereby the two
competing activities consume portions of time without being mutually
exclusive.277
The clause ceteris paribus implies that some relevant variables (e.g.,
education and its impact on crime/corrupt practices) are omitted.278
Moreover, the models are static, overlooking the fact that many criminals are
prolific offenders accumulating criminal human capital over a lengthy
career.279 This pattern is captured by analytical schemes which highlight the
dynamics of crime perpetrated by individuals over a life cycle (featuring the
idea of crime onset, specialization, and desistence).280 Such limitations
notwithstanding, even without conversion into complex multivariable
structures, rational choice models of crime (and corruption) possess
considerable explanatory power, predictability, and policy usefulness.281
Attempts by LE researchers to rigorously grapple with the nature and
containment of corrupt activities from a neoclassical microeconomic
perspective have been questioned on grounds other than the putative
preoccupation with narrow-centered utility maximization. Critics have
asserted that the emphatic differentiation between the private and public
domains, laying stress on the symptoms of dysfunctionality rife in the latter,
and insistence that it furnishes a unique habitat where corruption may freely
mushroom all constitute a misplaced intellectual endeavor.282 To lend
credence to this expression of disapproval, they point to the experience of
Northern European and Scandinavian countries, which have relatively large
and regulation-minded governments, but boast a low level of corruption.283
Again, this is an outdated and overly simplistic portrayal of the
underpinnings of the rational choice conceptual façade. The Northern
European and Scandinavian patterns may satisfactorily (albeit not fully) be
277. See generally Lance Lochner, Education, Work and Crime: A Human Capital
Approach, 45 INT’L ECON. REV. 811 (2004); Lance Lochner, Non-Production Benefits of
Education: Crime, Health, and Good Citizenship, in 4 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF
EDUCATION 183 (Eric A. Hanushek, Stephen Machin, & Ludger Woessmann eds. 2011).
278. See generally Lochner, Education, Work and Crime, supra note 277; Lochner, NonProduction Benefits of Education: Crime, Health, and Good Citizenship, supra note 277.
279. See generally Stephen Machin and Olivier Marie, Reducing Crime by Targeting
Prolific Offenders, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267411939_Reducing_Crime_
by_Targeting_Prolific_Offenders (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
280. See generally Lochner, Education, Work and Crime, supra note 277.
281. See generally Levitt & Miles, supra note 262; Draca & Machin, supra note 262;
Chaplin & McCray, supra note 262.
282. See Jancsics, supra note 225, at 359-360.
283. See id. at 360.
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explained with recourse to traditional (e.g., high standard of living, coupled
with substantial benefits, monetary and nonmonetary, enjoyed by public
sector employees) and augmented (e.g., education) microeconomic
formulations.284 More importantly, rational choice models—including those
focused on corrupt practices—liberally acknowledge market failures such as
excessive concentration of economic power (monopoly and its offshoots),
public goods, externalities, and asymmetric information, to mention just the
most glaring examples of departure from perfect competition.285
Critics counter, in a contrarian fashion, that a highly competitive market
environment is not a panacea because intense competition may prompt
agents to try to maximize opportunities and minimize threats by resorting to
rent-seeking.286 Still, it is recognized that the empirical evidence is
ambiguous in this respect.287 Notably, players in a fiercely competitive
market setting, characterized by diffusion of organizational power and
institutional fragmentation, may lack the necessary resources to effectively
pursue regulatory capture.288 Indeed, it is government failure, both
substantive and procedural, which may sow the seeds of market failure and
pave the way for the proliferation of corrupt activities.289
It is noteworthy that one of the most ubiquitous applications of rational
choice theory to corruption—the principal-agent model—is firmly rooted in
market failure territory or, to be more precise, its asymmetric information
284. See generally Theobald, supra note 226; Robinson, supra note 226; Bracking ed.,
supra note 226; Pellegrini, supra note 226; Soreide & Williams note 226; Dutta & Aidt, supra
note 226; Vashisht, supra note 226; Salvador Contreras, An Alternative View to the Cause of
Market Failures: A Dynamic Approach, 4 THEORETICAL ECON. LETTERS 548 (2014).
285. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 226, at 189-209; PELLEGRINI, supra note 226, 1327; Daron Acemoglu & Thierry Verdier, The Choice between Market Failures and
Corruption 90 AM. ECON. REV. 194 (2000); BERNARD SALANIE, MICROECONOMICS OF
MARKET FAILURES (2000); Roberto Burguet, Juan-Jose Ganuza, & Jose G. Montalvo, The
Microeconomics of Corruption. A Review of Thirty Years of Research, https://econpapers.
repec.org/paper/upfupfgen/1525.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
286. See Jancsics, supra note 225, at 363.
287. See id.; GRAF LAMBSDORFF, THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND
REFORM: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY, supra note 226, at 11-15.
288. See generally Sudarshan Jayaraman, S. P Kothari, & Karthik Ramanna, Capture and
Competition: The Role of Product Competition in Reallocating Rents from Regulatory
Capture, https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=NTA201
7&paper_id=69 (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
289. See generally Acemoglu & Verdier, supra note 285; PELLEGRINI, supra note 226, at
13-27; William R. Keech & Michael C. Munger, The Anatomy of Government Failure, 164
PUB. CHOICE 1 (2015); William R. Keech, Michael C. Munger, & Carl Simon, Market Failure
and Government Failure, http://michaelmunger.com/papers/keechmungersimon.pdf (last
visited Aug. 31, 2019).
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segment.290 A principal-agent problem emerges in situations where one or
more actors (individuals, group, organizations, or another collective
entity)—the “agents”—are entrusted with authority to act on behalf of some
other individual or collective entity (the “principal”).291 Depending on the
context, the principal might be a specific identifiable actor or set of actors
(like a bureaucratic supervisor or the shareholders of a corporation).292
Alternatively, the “principal” might be characterized as “society,” to reflect
the idea that certain agents (like political leaders and public servants) are
supposed to act in the best interests of the community.293 However, due to
information asymmetry favoring the agent(s), the principal(s) often cannot
perfectly monitor and control delegates, which gives rise to the risk that the
agent(s) may act in his/her/its/their own interest, rather than that of the
principal(s).294
The quintessential neoclassical solution to the problem is through
proper incentive and punishment mechanisms.295 Quantitative data are thus
adduced to evince that high public sector salaries depress corrupt
practices.296 Statistical findings also suggest that the principal(s) should drive
290. See generally ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY,
supra note 226; Martinez-Vasquez, del Granado, & Boex, supra note 226, at 19-24; ROBERT
KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION (1988); Nico Groenendijk, A Principal-Agent Model
of Corruption 27 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 207 (1997); JONG-SUNG YOU, DEMOCRACY,
INEQUALITY AND CORRUPTION: KOREA, TAIWAN AND THE PHILIPPINES COMPARED (2015);
JESPER JOHNSON, ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES IN FRAGILE STATES: THEORY AND PRACTICE
IN AID AGENCIES (2016); Luca Di Donato, A Behavioral Principal-Agent Theory to Study
Corruption and Tax Evasion, http://sog.luiss.it/sites/sog.luiss.it/files/Luca_def_SOG%20
Working%20Papers%20WP34-2016%20Di%20Donato.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
291. See generally KLITGAARD, supra note 290; Groenendijk, supra note 290; JOHNSON,
supra note 290; Di Donato, supra note 290.
292. See generally KLITGAARD, supra note 290; Groenendijk, supra note 290; JOHNSON,
supra note 290; Di Donato, supra note 290.
293. See generally KLITGAARD, supra note 290; Groenendijk, supra note 290; JOHNSON,
supra note 290; Di Donato, supra note 290.
294. See generally KLITGAARD, supra note 290; Groenendijk, supra note 290; JOHNSON,
supra note 290; Di Donato, supra note 290.
295. See generally Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance,
and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Reforming Public Bureaucracy through Economic Incentives, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 131 (186);
Pranab Bardhan, The Economist’s Approach to the Problem of Corruption, 34 WORLD DEV.
341 (2006).
296. See generally Caroline Van Rijckeghem & Beatrice Weder, Bureaucratic
Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Wages in the Civil Service Affect Corruption, and
by How Much?, 65 J. DEV. ECON. 307 (2001); Omar Azfar & William R. Nelson,
Transparency, Wages, and the Separation of Powers: An Experimental Analysis of
Corruption, 130 PUB. CHOICE 471 (2007).
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up the costs of corruption for the agent(s) embroiled in unlawful activities.297
The empirical findings include those generated in laboratory-like
experiments, lending support to the view that increased detection and heavy
sanctions discourage agents from engaging in corrupt practices.298 Ideas have
also been put forward as to how to minimize monitoring and control costs
for principals and further push up transaction costs for agents through
various innovative schemes.299 On their part, behaviorally inclined LE
researchers have shown that unlawful agent conduct may be the product of
cognitive biases stemming from the misperception of contexts, risks, and
other relevant variables impinging on the individual and collective decision
process.300
A thorny challenge is confronted, acutely so in the public realm, when
both the principal(s) (generally politician[s] but even entire societies) and the
agent(s) (typically bureaucrat[s] but can be politicians as well) are corrupt,
with the community facing a collective action problem.301 While principalagent theory can be said to lie at the interface between neoclassical
economics and its institutional counterpart, in that it acknowledges that
corruption may be an organizational as well as individual issue (“bad barrel”
versus “bad apple”) and incorporates elements of property rights and
transaction costs, it is not sufficiently broad-based to address this challenge
in a wide-ranging manner. Such conceptual and practical difficulties
ineluctably lead LE scholars concerned with corrupt activities into the sphere
of institutional economics (encompassing the fast growing constitutional
ingredient).302
297. See generally Klaus Abbink, Laboratory Experiments on Corruption, in
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 418 (Susan Rose-Ackerman
ed., 2006).
298. See generally id.
299. See generally Groenendijk, supra note 290.
300. See generally Di Donato, supra note 290.
301. See generally BO ROTHSTEIN, THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT: CORRUPTION, SOCIAL
TRUST, AND INEQUALITY IN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE (2011); Anna Persson, Bo Rothstein & Jan
Teorell, Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systematic Corruption as a Collective Action
Problem, 26 GOVERNANCE 449 (2013).
302. See generally ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 226; Groenendijk, supra note 290; Abed
& Gupta, supra note 226; Graf Lambsdorff, Taube & Schramm, supra note 226; GRAF
LAMBSDORFF, THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND REFORM: THEORY,
EVIDENCE AND POLICY, supra note 226; PELLEGRINI, supra note 226; ROSE-ACKERMAN &
PALFIKA, supra note 226; Jeffrey Sachs, Wing Thye Woo, & Xiaokai Yang, Economic
Reforms and Constitutional Transition, http://www.earth.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/Sachs
%20Writing/2000/EconomicReformsandConstitutionalTransition_2000.pdf (last visited Aug.
31, 2019).
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This paradigm does not negate the significance of incentives.303 It
places strong emphasis, however, on the normative and institutional
structures, formal and informal, in which illegal transactions are
embedded.304 Individuals and collective entities are believed to regard these
exogenous structural configurations, or constraints, as given and are thought
to navigate accordingly, whether in an optimal or a satisficing fashion.305
Therein is found the difference between institutional economics and
economic sociology. The latter lays equal stress on norms, institutions, and
social embedding as forces shaping human behavior, but it downplays the
importance of goal-oriented maneuvering, whether optimal or satisficing in
nature.306 Institutional economists also proceed on the assumption that, for
better or worse, people possess the capacity to construct social norms and
institutions, whereas economic sociologists do not accord much weight to
this proposition.307
The institutional economic agenda thus centers on the inadequacies of
the normative underpinnings of the legal, political, and administrative edifice
and its structural flaws.308 The need has been firmly underlined for credible
system-wide accountability, elevated transparency, viable information
disclosure coupled with easy access to its sources, organizational checksand-balances, rule of law, judicial independence, well-delineated and readily
enforceable property rights, robust procedures for minimizing opportunities
for regulatory cartelization and capture, freedom of the media, fostering
societal trust (with the exception of that permeating corrupt networks),
impairing governance mechanisms underlying the entrenchment/path
dependency of corruption, containing transaction costs, eroding the
foundations of corrupt relational contracting, eliminating or at least seriously
handicapping intermediaries facilitating corruption, streamlining
government acquisition and provision of goods and services, recalibrating
bureaucratic entry (recruitment and selection), mitigating conflicts of
interest, pursuing strategies designed to promote ethical conduct, forging

303. See Johann Graff Lambsdorff, Markus Taube & Matthias Schramm, Corrupt
Contracting: Exploring the Analytical Capacity of New Institutional Economics and New
Economic Sociology, in Graf Lambsdorff, Taube & Schramm eds., supra note 226, at 1, 2.
304. See id. at 2.
305. See id.; J. Neil Bearden & Terry Connolly, Optimal Satisficing, https://www.research
gate.net/publication/229005787_Optimal_satisficing (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
306. See Graff Lambsdorff, Taube & Schramm, supra note 303, at 2, 3-7.
307. See id.
308. See generally id.; GRAFF LAMBSDORFF, THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF
CORRUPTION AND REFORM: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND POLICY, supra note 226.
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multilateral policy cooperation, and embracing a holistic approach that
considers the normative-institutional fabric in its entirety.309
A key issue which has long vexed institutional economists is the
relationship between the structure of government, particularly the degree of
political centralization/decentralization, and corruption.310 Drawing on
insights derived from conventional industrial organization theory, LE
researchers have tended to posit that decentralization is likely to spur corrupt
activities, without necessarily implying that centralization is invariably a
dependable remedy for the problem.311 Both in their decentralized and
centralized incarnation, corrupt practices exert pernicious influence but, on
balance, the former structural constellation appears to be more conducive to
corruption, although the fact that a highly centralized government may be
saddled with a markedly decentralized system of corruption complicates the
picture.312
This line of reasoning has been challenged by scholars identified with
the new institutional economics (NIE).313 They have advocated reforms
featuring devolution of service delivery, contracting out, purchaser-provider
split, and greater competition on the grounds that, in such an environment,
accountability is enhanced by the exercise of exit and voice by citizens and
subnational governments’ ability to adapt strategies to local needs.314 It has
been argued that some of the positive effects engendered in the process may
dissipate, however, because decentralization inevitably lowers ex ante and
ex post transaction costs for corrupt agents as the number of bureaucratic
layers is reduced, leading to potentially higher levels of corruption.315
LE researchers of all persuasions pay close attention to the economic
consequences of corrupt activities.316 The earlier view was that corruption
should not be regarded as a cost but the ineluctable product of structural
impediments to growth and, as such, an element in the developmental
309. See generally Graf Lambsdorff, Taube & Shramm, supra note 303; GRAFF
LAMBSDORFF, supra note 226; Olken, supra note 226; ROSE-ACKERMAN & PALFIKA, supra
note 226.
310. See Martinez-Vasquez, del Granado, & Boex, supra 226, at 15-18.
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. See id. at 17-18.
314. See id. at 17.
315. See id. at 17.
316. See generally THEOBALD, supra note 226; Robinson ed., supra note 226; Abed &
Gupta eds., supra note 226; Bracking ed., supra note 226; PELLEGRINI, supra note 226; Olken
& Pande, supra note 226; Søreide & Williams eds., supra note 226; Dutta & Aidt eds., supra
note 226; VASHISHT, supra note 226.
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dynamics capable of boosting efficiency by “greasing the wheels of the
economy.”317 Generally speaking, however, this unorthodox position no
longer finds meaningful support in the academic literature on the subject.318
Rather, the consensus opinion currently reflects the belief that corrupt
practices are the source of a host of distortions and inefficiencies, and thus a
hindrance to socioeconomic progress.319
It is true that, in certain circumstances, corruption may augment the
income of low-paid public employees, but it more often transfers resources
to the rich and privileged.320 Moreover, gains from corrupt activities are
unlikely to be invested in the productive sector of the economy.321 To make
matters worse, proceeds from such pursuits, when undertaken on a large
scale, tend to be channeled to foreign bank accounts, resulting in a leakage
of domestic capital without any ensuing resource distribution.322 On the
fiscal side, the harmful effects of corruption manifest themselves in declining
efficiency and rising prices of public services.323 The private sector is not
immune to the malaise because the upward pressure on costs stifles

317. See generally Nathaniel H. Leff, Economic Development through Bureaucratic
Corruption, 8 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 8 (1964); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON,
POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968); Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and
Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1320 (1997).
318. See generally THEOBALD, supra note 226; Robinson ed., supra note 226; Abed &
Gupta eds., supra note 226; Bracking ed., supra note 226; PELLEGRINI, supra note 226; Olken
& Pande, supra note 226; Søreide & Williams eds., supra note 226; Dutta & Aidt eds., supra
note 226; VASHISHT, supra note 226.
319. See generally THEOBALD, supra note 226; Robinson ed., supra note 226; Abed &
Gupta eds., supra note 226; Bracking ed., supra note 226; PELLEGRINI, supra note 226; Olken
& Pande, supra note 226; Søreide & Williams eds., supra note 226; Dutta & Aidt eds., supra
note 226; VASHISHT, supra note 226.
320. See generally Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi, & Rosa Alonso-Terme, Does
Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?, INT’L MONETARY FUND, (1998), https://
www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/30/Does-Corruption-Affect-Income-Inequ
ality-and-Poverty-2629.
321. See generally David J. Gould & Jose A. Amaro-Reyes, The Effects of Corruption on
Administrative Performance: Illustrations from Developing Countries, 7 (The World Bank
Staff Working Papers, Paper No. 580, 1983).
322. See generally id.
323. See generally id.
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productivity.324 On a more general level, flagrant corruption may undermine
economic stability, government legitimacy, and the rule of law.325
A recent study questions some elements of the consensus view
regarding the relationship between corrupt practices and economic
performance.326 Specifically, the empirical findings offered therein suggest
that institutions may play the role of an intervening or mediating variable in
determining the outcome of the interaction between these two factors.327
Thus, in fragile States where an institutional vacuum prevails, however
disagreeable this may sound, a modicum of corruption may indeed “grease
the wheels of the economy,” by providing the necessary “lubricant.”328 The
institutional dynamics, if any, may also impinge on the interplay between
corrupt activities and economic growth, which is the principal focus of the
survey.329
The growing academic LE literature on corruption hence continues to
highlight, in a neoclassical (“reward-and-punishment”) fashion, the
importance of material incentives and criminal justice system effectiveness
in influencing the propensity to engage in corrupt practices, but no longer to
the exclusion of other relevant variables. Institutional and behavioral
economics have come to the fore and have stretched, at least at the margin,
the boundaries of this policy-centered field of scientific inquiry. A more
diverse picture, perhaps less clear-cut but to a greater extent in tune with
intricate socioeconomic realities, has consequently emerged, with
implications for both the exploration of the roots of corruption and strategies
to combat its symptoms.
VI. The Era of Xi Jinping

324. See generally Geeta Batra, Daniel Kaufman, & Andrew H. W. Stone, The Firms
Speak: What the World Business Environment Survey Tells Us about Constraints on Private
Sector Development, (Oct. 2003), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=541388.
325. See generally ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 226; ROSE-ACKERMAN & PALFIKA,
supra note 226.
326. See generally de Vaal & Ebben, supra note 225.
327. See generally id.
328. See generally id.
329. See generally id. See also Jan Hanousek & Evžen Kočenda, Public Investment and
Fiscal Performance in the New EU Member States, 32 FISCAL STUD. 43 (2011); Jan Hanousek
& Anna Kochanova, Bribery Environment and Firm Performance: Evidence from Central
and Eastern European Countries (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No.
DP10499, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2584017.
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Since its founding, the PRC has had two transformative leaders: Mao
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.330 The former fundamentally altered the
bourgeois-like political landscape while keeping the country in a state of
permanent turmoil and isolated from the outside world, whereas the latter
recommercialized the sagging revolutionary facade and restored stability by,
inter alia, promoting rule-based governance (not to be equated with the rule
of law) and economic opening.331 Deng was succeeded by two non-pathbreaking leaders, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who faithfully adhered to his
policy agenda without broadening and deepening it substantially.332 Hu, in
particular, has been singled out for becoming hamstrung by the complexities
of collective decision-making and succumbing to institutional inertia.333
It is a moot point whether this constitutes an entirely fair assessment.334
Hu and his de facto partner, Premier Wen Jiabao, were able to sustain
economic growth and minimize vulnerability to exogenous shocks in the
wake of the 2008/09 global financial crisis.335 The two leaders, especially
Hu, were also instrumental in dramatically improving relations with Taiwan,
perhaps their greatest achievement.336 Moreover, while it is now fashionable
and possibly politically expedient to present this as a sign of weakness, Hu
and Wen were, by CCP standards, genuine consensus-builders, to a degree
apparently unlikely to be seen for the foreseeable future.337
After serving two five-year terms, both Hu and Wen retired in 2012, in
accordance with the leadership succession norms and rules promulgated by
Deng Xiaoping,338 with the former giving up his positions as General
Secretary of the CCP, President of the PRC, and Chairman of the Central
Military Commission (as well as the elusive “Paramount Leader” status).339
330. See generally EZRA F. VOGEL, DENG XIAOPING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA
(2013).
331. See generally id.
332. See generally WILLY W. L. LAM, THE ERA OF JIANG ZEMIN (1999); WILLY W. L. LAM,
CHINESE POLITICS IN THE HU JINTAO ERA: NEW LEADERS, NEW CHALLENGES (2006).
333. See generally LAM, CHINESE POLITICS IN THE HU JINTAO ERA: NEW LEADERS, NEW
CHALLENGES, supra note 332.
334. See generally Kerry Brown, What Did Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Do for China?,
BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-21669780.
335. See id.
336. See id.
337. See id.
338. See generally Zhengxu Wang & Anastas Vangeli, The Rules and Norms of
Leadership Succession in China: From Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping and Beyond, 76 CHINA
J. 24 (2016).
339. See generally id.
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They were replaced in an orderly fashion by Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, with
no indications that the Deng-prescribed delicate balancing act, consisting of
a measure of separation between party and State (Xi’s and Li’s putative
spheres of influence, respectively) in a finely calibrated (again, by CCP
standards) system of potentially divergent forces would not persist for a long
time to come.340
The expectation of path dependency on the leadership front may have
been wholly realistic, given the experience of the previous four decades, but
it has not materialized.341 Rather uncharacteristically, China has witnessed a
marked departure from the well-entrenched pattern of incremental
adaptation342—a dramatic u-turn akin to “punctuated equilibrium.”343 While
Xi’s reformist credentials are significantly overstated,344 there can be little
doubt that he has substantially reconfigured the Deng-inspired Chinese
governance regime and the vision underlying it, subject to the qualification
that mean reversion and even sharp swings of the political pendulum in the
opposite direction can never be ruled out in China.345

340. See generally id.
341. See generally CHINA ENTERING THE XI JINPING ERA (Yongnian Zheng & Lance P.
Gore eds., 2014); WILLY W. L. LAM, CHINESE POLITICS IN THE ERA OF XI JINPING:
RENAISSANCE, REFORM, OR RETROGRESSION? (2015); ROBERT ROSS & JO I. BEKKEVOLD,
CHINA IN THE ERA OF XI JINPING: DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES (2016); CHINA
IN THE XI JINPING ERA (Steve Tsang & Honghua Men eds., 2016); Robert D. Blackwill & Kurt
M. Campbell, Xi Jinping on the Global Stage: Chinese Foreign Policy under a Powerful but
Exposed Leader, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Feb. 2016, Council Special Report No.
74, https://www.cfr.org/report/xi-jinping-global-stage.
342. See generally CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORMS: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
INCREMENTALISM (Peter Nolan & Qimiao Fan eds., 1994); Yongnian Zheng, Political
Incrementalism: Political Lessons from China’s 20 Years of Reform, 20 THIRD WORLD Q.
1157 (1999); Yijia Jing, Creative Incrementalism: Governance Reforms in China Since 1978,
2 CHINESE POL. SCI. REV. 56 (2017).
343. See generally Weixing Hu, Explaining Change and Stability in Cross-Strait
Relations: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model, 21 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 933 (2012); Kwan Nok
Chan & Shuang Zhao, Punctuated Equilibrium and the Information Disadvantage of
Authoritarianism: Evidence from the People’s Republic of China, 44 POL’Y STUD. J. 134
(2016).
344. See generally Jonathan Fenby, Xi Jinping Is Not a Reformer but China’s Most
Authoritarian Leader Since Mao, SPECTATOR (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.spectator.
co.uk/2017/10/xi-jinping-is-not-a-reformer-but-chinas-most-authoritarian-leader-since-mao/
(last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
345. See generally Jonathan Fenby, Xi Jinping Is Not a Reformer but China’s Most
Authoritarian Leader Since Mao, SPECTATOR (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.spectator.
co.uk/2017/10/xi-jinping-is-not-a-reformer-but-chinas-most-authoritarian-leader-since-mao/
(last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
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Deng is best remembered for revitalizing the long-moribund Chinese
economy through a two-pronged strategy of domestic marketization and
external opening.346 He also embarked on far-reaching institutional
reengineering, however, to avert reemergence of Mao Zedong’s so-called
“one-voice chamber.”347 The underlying rationale was that, to prevent the reoccurrence of traumatic experiences such as the Great Leap Forward and
Cultural Revolution, it was essential to substitute the rule of law, coupled
with the primacy of institutions, for the “rule of personality.”348 Accordingly,
he instituted a collective form of leadership, with the CCP General Secretary
operating as at most “first among equals”; pursued the separation of party
and State; implemented the principle of “five lakes and four seas,” or
delegation of authority to subnational units; jettisoned the reliance on largescale campaigns/mass movements to achieve ideological goals; and took
concrete steps to depoliticize/professionalize the military.349
Xi has persistently and systematically overturned the first four pillars
of this multifaceted blueprint and has selectively but crucially impaired the
fifth.350 The notion of collective leadership was quickly consigned to
oblivion: “Almost from day one, the new supreme leader started a power
grab that [was] as stunning as it [was] inimical to Deng’s ideals about putting
institutions ahead of individuals.”351 Over time, a series of shrewd political
and structural maneuvers, the latest allowing the President to hold
indefinitely the reins of power,352 has enabled Xi to “ride roughshod over the
entire Party-military establishment.”353 Consequently, “[t]he theory and
practice of … collective leadership have been dealt a body blow.”354 This
drastic shift has been given official recognition with the designation of Xi as
the country’s “core leader” and the addition to the party’s constitution of his
“thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era.”355
346. See generally VOGEL, supra note 330.
347. See LAM, supra note 341, at xii.
348. See id.
349. See id.
350. See id. at xii-xiv.
351. Id. at xiii.
352. See generally Choi Chi-yuk, Jun Mai & Matt Ho, China Will Scrap Limit on
Presidential Terms, Meaning Xi Jinping Can Stay On, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 25,
2018, 4:15 PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2134624/chinawill-scrap-limit-presidents-term-meaning-xi.
353. LAM, supra note 341, at xiii.
354. Id.
355. See generally Lance P. Gore, Elevating Xi Jinping to the “Core” of Chinese
Leadership, 8 EAST ASIAN POL’Y 5 (2016); Shi Jiangtao, Congress Concludes with President
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Xi has also sharply deviated from three of Deng’s strategic tenets
relating to the modus operandi of the governance regime.356 First, he has
greatly tightened the CCP’s grip on all aspects of sociopolitical life, private
and public, with the separation between party and State becoming a thing of
the past357 and the CCP reverting to its above-the-law status (i.e., rule of law
mutating into rule by law and possibly rule of man).358 Second, he has
reembraced factionalism, an anathema to Deng, on a scale exceeding that of
his two predecessors by crashing rival networks and surrounding himself
with a coterie of trusted loyalists.359 Third, he has adopted a “top-level
institutional design,” reimposing firm central government control over
subnational units.360 Fourth, he has resurrected “Maoist political campaigns
with a gusto.”361
Additionally, while selectively promoting professionalism in the
military domain, Xi has reversed Deng’s practice of endeavoring to keep the
generals at bay.362 Specifically, he has significantly boosted the military
budget and has brought generals into the epicenter of the political arena.363
Having previously served as secretary to a defense minister, Xi has a
penchant for military affairs and has spearheaded the transfer of a record
number of former senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers and
defense industry officials to key party and government positions,
proclaiming in his capacity as commander in chief that “I, too am a military
man who has become a cadre [in civilian departments].”364

Xi Jinping as Undisputed “Core” Leader, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 24, 2017, 10:15
PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2116830/congress-conclude
s-xi-undisputed-core-leader.
356. See LAM, supra note 341, at xiii-xiv.
357. See generally Lance P. Gore, Rebuilding the Leninist Party Rule: Chinese
Communist Party under Xi Jinping, 8 EAST ASIAN POL’Y 5 (2017); Sabine Muscat & Matthias
Stepan, In Xi’s China, the Party Morphs into the State, MERCATOR INSTITUTE FOR CHINA
STUDIES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.merics.org/en/blog/xis-china-party-morphs-state.
358. See generally Gore, supra note 357; George G. Chen, Le Droit, C’est Moi: Xi
Jinping’s New Rule-by-Law Approach, OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS HUB (July 26, 2017), http://
ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/le-droit-cest-moi-xi-jinpings-new-rule-by-law-approach; Zachary Keck,
4th Plenum: Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 20, 2014), https://
thediplomat.com/2014/10/4th-plenum-rule-of-law-with-chinese-characteristics/.
359. See LAM, supra note 341at xiii-xiv.
360. See id. at xiv.
361. Id.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. Id.
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A heavy concentration of power and its determined projection, coupled
with inexorable top-down steering and vigorous suppression of autonomous
bottom-up forces, have been the hallmarks of the Xi era strategic
initiatives.365 At home, the cult of personality has resurfaced in forms unseen
since the late 1970s,366 ideological indoctrination has been intensified,367
nationalist sentiment has been whipped up,368 access to information has been
curtailed,369 crackdown on civil society has been stepped up,370 ethnic
minority rights have been scaled back,371 State capitalism has regained its
upper hand over its market counterpart,372 central planning has been
revived,373 industrial policy has been relaunched,374 and the party has

365. See id. at xiv-xvii. See also ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE THIRD REVOLUTION: XI
JINPING AND THE NEW CHINESE STATE (2018).
366. See generally Wang Xiangwei, As Fears of Xi’s Personality Cult Deepen, China
Must Dial Down the Propaganda, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 24, 2018, 1:16 PM),
http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2138481/fears-xis-personality-cult-deepenchina-must-dial-down-propaganda.
367. See generally Mark C. Eades, Chinese Nightmare: Education and Thought Control
in Xi Jinping’s China, FOREIGN POLICY ASS’N (Apr. 5, 2016), https://foreignpolicyblogs.
com/2016/04/05/education-and-thought-control-in-xi-jinpings-china/.
368. See LAM, supra note 341, at xiv-xvi; John R. Cookson, The Real Threat of Chinese
Nationalism, NATIONAL INTEREST (Aug. 28, 2015), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/
the-real-threat-chinese-nationalism-13729.
369. See generally Chang Ping et al., Xi Jinping’s Power Grab and China’s Media
Politics, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 5, 2018, 11:06 AM), https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/
listeningpost/2018/03/xi-jinping-power-grab-china-media-politics-180303110448732.html;
Beina Xu & Eleanor Albert, Media Censorship in China, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
(Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-censorship-china.
370. See generally HONG KONG FREE PRESS, Cyberspace, Religion, Lawyers, Dissidents:
China’s Shrinking Civil Society under Xi Jinping’s Crackdown (Oct. 18, 2017, 11:29 AM),
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/10/18/cyberspace-religion-lawyers-dissidents-chinas-sh
rinking-civil-society-xi-jinpings-crackdown/.
371. See generally Associated Press, Human Rights in China under Xi Jinping “Worst
since Tiananmen Crackdown”: Amnesty, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 17, 2017, 11:15
AM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2120318/human-rights-chi
na-under-xi-jinping-worst-tiananmen.
372. See generally Roland Rajah, Xi Jinping’s State Capitalism Is Here to Stay, LOWY
INSTITUTE (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/xi-jinping-state-capi
talism-here-stay.
373. See generally Andrew Browne, China Uses “Digital Leninism” to Manage Economy
and Monitor Citizens: Xi Jinping Is Leading China into a Big-Data Dictatorship, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 17, 2017, 6:57 AM), https:// www.wsj.com/articles/xi-jinping-leads-china-into-bigdata-dictatorship-1508237820.
374. See generally Mark Magnier, China’s Latest Industrial Policy Is a Waste and a
Challenge, Business Group Says, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2017, 12:12 PM), https://blogs.wsj.
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expanded its tentacles into the far reaches of the sprawling economy.375
Abroad, for all intents and purposes, Hu’s vision of a harmonious world376
and good neighbor policy377 been rendered null and void,378 replaced with an
ambitious drive to establish a subservient regional regime akin to the
Imperial tributary system379—as evidenced by muscle flexing in the South
China Sea,380 pursuit of the One Belt-One Road scheme,381 and quest to

com/chinarealtime/2017/03/07/chinas-latest-industrial-policy-is-a-waste-and-a-challenge-bu
siness-group-says/.
375. See generally Keith Zhai, China’s Xi to Tighten Communist Party Grip on Economic
Life, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2018, 5:47 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201803-06/china-s-xi-readies-sweeping-government-overhaul-to-empower-party.
376. See generally JEAN-MARC F. BLANCHARD ET AL., “HARMONIOUS WORLD” AND
CHINA’S NEW FOREIGN POLICY (Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard eds., 2008); CHINA
IN SEARCH OF HARMONIOUS SOCIETY (Sujian Guo & Baogang Guo eds., 2008); Liu Jianfei,
Sino-US Relations and Building a Harmonious World, 18 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 479 (2009);
ROSITA DELLIOS & R. JAMES FERGUSON, CHINA’S QUEST FOR GLOBAL ORDER: FROM
PEACEFUL RISE TO HARMONIOUS WORLD (2013); CHIUNG-CHIU HUANG & CHIH-YU SHIH,
HARMONIOUS INTERVENTION: CHINA’S QUEST FOR RELATIONAL SECURITY (2014); CHIH-YU
SHIH, SINICIZING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: SELF, CIVILIZATION, AND INTELLECTUAL
POLITICS IN SUBALTERN EAST ASIA (2013); Chih-Yu Shih & Jiwu Yin, Between Core National
Interest and a Harmonious World: Reconciling Self-Role Conceptions in Chinese Foreign
Policy, 6 CHINESE J. INT’L POL. 59 (2013); ASTRID H. M. NORDIN, CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND HARMONIOUS WORLD: TIME, SPACE, AND MULTIPLICITY IN WORLD POLITICS
(Jeny Edkins and Nick Vaughan-Williams eds., 2016).
377. See generally Robert Sutter, China’s Good Neighbor Policy and its Implications for
Taiwan, 13 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 717 (2004); Chien-peng Chung, The “Good Neighbour
Policy” in the Context of China’s Foreign Relations, 7 CHINA: INT’L J. 107 (2009); CHIENPENG CHUNG, CHINA’S MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC:
INSTITUTIONALIZING BEIJING’S “GOOD NEIGHBOUR POLICY” (2010); Maria D. Cabras, China’s
Peaceful Rise and the Good Neighbor Policy, EUROPEAN STRATEGIST (Dec. 11, 2011), http://
www.eurstrat.eu/chinas- peaceful-rise-and-the-good-neighbor-policy/.
378. See generally Niall Duggan, Harmonious World: It Seems It Was Only a Dream, 19
INT’L STUD. REV. 328 (2017); Chris Buckley, Xi of Two Minds: Be a Good Neighbor, or Assert
China’s Power?, NEW YORK TIMES: SINOSPHERE, DISPATCHES FROM CHINA (June 12, 2014,
1:49 AM), https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/xi-of-two-minds-be-a-good-nei
ghbor-or-assert-chinas-power/?_r=0.
379. See generally John Garver, China Rules the World?, https://www.chinacenter.net/
2016/china_currents/15-2/china-rules-world/.
380. See generally BILL HAYTON, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN
ASIA (2014); RICHARD Q. TURCSÁNYI, CHINESE ASSERTIVENESS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA:
POWER SOURCES, DOMESTIC POLITICS, AND REACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY (2017).
381. See generally TAI WEI LIM, HENRY CHAN, KATHERINE TSENG & WEN XIN LIM,
CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD INITIATIVE (2016).
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breathe life into the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as an alternative
to the United States/Japan-dominated Asian Development Bank.382
This policy thrust is the embodiment of a distinctly neo-authoritarian
outlook,383 in all likelihood reflecting not merely Xi’s beliefs and concerns,
but also his chosen leadership pathway and decision-making style.384 Despite
his high visibility, Xi remains something of a mystery385 and, impressions to
the contrary notwithstanding, he appears to be less predictable and to possess
a more multidimensional personality than commonly assumed.386 This
renders it difficult to place his conduct as the head of State and the way he
addresses challenges/problems within the framework of available
taxonomies which, by their very nature, aim to abstract from reality and to
reduce social phenomena to “ideal types.”387
Despite such difficulties, a degree of clarity and coherence may be
achieved by imposing a modicum of structure on a behavioral phenomenon
characterized by a measure of haziness and intricacy. Political leadership has
been studied extensively and several typologies have been developed in the
process.388 The ones most relevant in this context appear to be those devised

382. See generally TANG SIEW MUN, THE POLITICS OF THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
INVESTMENT BANK (AIIB) (2015); MING WAN, THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
BANK: THE CONSTRUCTION OF POWER AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE EAST ASIAN
INTERNATIONAL ORDER (Ming Wan & Natasha Hamilton-Hart eds., 2016).
383. See LAM, supra note 341, at xvi-xvii.
384. See generally id. at 34-150; Lance L. P. Gore, What is Xi Jinping Made of: Xi in His
Own Words, 7 EAST ASIAN POL’Y 30 (2017); Wei Shan, Xi Jinping’s Policy Style, 8 EAST
ASIAN POL’Y 42 (2016); Jeffrey Hays, Xi Jinping’s Style, Leadership and Personality Cult:
Xi Jinping as the Leader of China, FACTS AND DETAILS (Sept. 2016), http://factsand
details.com/china/cat2/4sub5/entry-4302.html; Richard McGregor, Xi Jinping Moment,
LOWY INSTITUTE (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/xi-jinping-mom
ent; Andrew Van Dam, We Looked at Almost 100 Leaders Who Tried Xi Jinping-Style
Power Grabs. Here’s How They Turned Out, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2018, 3:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/03/15/a-brief-93-part-history-of-pow
er-grabs-from-ferdinand-marcos-to-xi-jinping/.
385. See generally Tom Plate, Why Xi Jinping Remains an International Man of Mystery
to Most in the US, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 4, 2016, 5:50 PM), http://www.scmp.
com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1897943/why-xi-jinping-remains-international-man-m
ystery-most-us.
386. See generally Wei, supra note 384.
387. See generally Udo Kuckartz, Ideal Types or Empirical Types: The Case of Max
Weber’s Empirical Research, 31 BULLETIN DE METHODOLOGIE SOCIOLOGIQUE 44 (1991).
388. See generally THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
(Joseph Masciulli, Mikhail A. Molchanov & W. Andy Knight eds., 2009); OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (R. A. W. Rhodes & Paul T. Hart eds., 2014).
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by Brown389 and Deutsch.390 The former has identified four categories, not
necessarily mutually exclusive, in which political leaders may be placed:
redefining, transformational, revolutionary, and totalitarian.391 The
redefining pattern constitutes a new addition to the analytical vocabulary and
is equated with a tendency to reconfigure the parameters of politics by
repositioning the regime in terms of what is desirable and feasible.392
Deutsch, on the other hand, has chosen to adhere to the traditional distinction
between strong and weak leadership modalities, but has combined it with the
breadth/depth of support enjoyed by the leader and the fit between his/her
strategies and the prevailing circumstances.393
The academic literature on political leaders’/policy styles is distinctly
sparse, by comparison. The classical work of Richardson and his
collaborators, published nearly four decades ago, remains virtually the sole
meaningful contribution in this pivotal area of scientific inquiry.394 After
carefully surveying the Western European scene, his team concluded that a
leader’s modus operandi could be located within a space occupied by two
continuums ranging from a consensual relationship/style to one marked by
coercion/imposition and from anticipatory/active problem-solving to
reactive problem-solving.395 While this classification is the product of an
empirical encounter with region-specific, rather than worldwide, realities, it
is sufficiently grounded in broad-based conceptual schemes to be deemed
generally valuable.396
Given the picture presented in this section, it may confidently be argued
that Xi is a strong head of State who has attained wide support or at least one
who does not face any consequential opposition. Although some observers
might be inclined to depict Xi’s actions as transformative, it is more
appropriate to regard him as a redefining leader and, if not totalitarian, then
as quasi-totalitarian in his orientation. It is premature to authoritatively
assess the situational fitness of the entire package of Xi’s strategies,

389. See generally ARCHIE BROWN, THE MYTH OF THE STRONG LEADER: POLITICAL
LEADERSHIP IN THE MODERN AGE (2014).
390. See generally KARL W. DEUTSCH, THE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (3d
ed. 1988).
391. See BROWN, supra note 389, at 101-203.
392. See id. at 101-147.
393. See DEUTSCH, supra note 390, at 71-73.
394. See generally Jeremy Richardson, Gunnel Gustafson, & Grant Jordan, The Concept
of Policy Style, in POLICY STYLES IN WESTERN EUROPE 1 (Jeremy Richardson ed. 1982).
395. See id. at 10-14.
396. See id.
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particularly from a long-term perspective but, the aura of invincibility
projected notwithstanding, there is no compelling reason to assume that the
vision pursued and the tactics employed will inevitably serve the country
well overall, due to inadequate investment in social and institutional
capital,397 subject to the qualification that the emerging Chinese governance
model could prove to be a historical outlier.398 Xi’s style is obviously
coercive in nature, relying heavily on top-down imposition. Insofar as
anticipation versus reaction is concerned, he can be said to be forward
looking, yet when it comes to implementation, risk taking on the political
front often gives way to risk aversion on the economic side.
A highly centralized and personalized regime, presided over by a
“strongman,” who is neither constrained by pockets of credible opposition
nor hampered procedurally, and who is willing to selectively but forcefully
redefine the status quo could either breed or stifle corruption. From a purely
statistical perspective, the odds favor the former outcome.399 This case may
be different, however, in that combating corrupt activities synergistically
serves both the opportunistic/personal and larger/strategic goals of the
country’s leadership. It may simultaneously be relied upon as a tool for
suppressing resistance and consolidating power and as a vehicle for CCP
revival and national rejuvenation. The ongoing battle against such sociolegal ills has thus ineluctably become perhaps the most prominent feature of
the Xi era and inextricably intertwined with his heavily loaded political
agenda.
VII. The Current Anticorruption Campaign
As indicated previously, crusades against the abuse of power, public
and private, particularly the former, have ample precedent in China. Indeed,
they have deep historical roots.400 Notably, in the early years of the Ming
dynasty (1368-1644), Chinese emperors were profoundly troubled by the
breadth and severity of corrupt practices and literally obsessed with
397. See generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE
ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2013).
398. See generally Bonnie S. Glaser, Is China Proselytizing its Path to Success, http://
www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/01/11/is-china-proselytising-its-path-to-success/ (last visited
Aug. 31, 2019). But see Eric C. Hendricks, The China Model Is Failing, http://quillette.
com/2018/04/10/china-model-failing/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
399. See generally Van Dam, supra note 384.
400. See generally Jamil Anderlini, Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Drive Mimics a Ming
Obsession, FINANCIAL TIMES, https://www.ft.com/content/39860d76-d9b3-11e7-a039-c64b
1c09b482 (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
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unearthing and suppressing them.401 An elaborate network of “touring
inspectors” was established and relied upon to spot instances of graft.402
Parties presumed to be guilty of such transgressions were harshly dealt with:
“Bribe-taking officials were flayed before execution and their skin attached
to mannequins in ‘scarecrow temples’ to serve as warnings to others. In more
serious cases entire clans were put to death.”403
This strategy did not prove successful, because of its inherent flaws and
loss of momentum.404 Despite the wide scope and great intensity of the initial
drive, the Ming dynasty unraveled under the weight of its corrupt
bureaucracy and was consigned to the dustbin of history by the invading
Manchu armies.405 Nevertheless, in addition to bringing into focus the
potential threat to the regime the prevalence of graft poses, with the imperial
“Mandate of Heaven” inevitably surrendered due to the pervasiveness of
graft, this episode serves as a useful reminder of the historical undercurrents
shaping the anticorruption campaigns in China, their marked symbolic
connotations, and ultimately their strategic prominence.406
The early Ming dynasty years saw ambitious policy initiatives on other
fronts as well. Above all, its rulers aspired to revive Chinese culture and
tradition.407 In parallel, they sought to modernize the economy, specifically
its mainstay: the sprawling agricultural sector.408 These efforts were also
conceptually and structurally suboptimal409 but, in conjunction with the
vigorous drive to eradicate corrupt activities, they helped to keep the riven
with contradictions and fundamentally vulnerable empire alive for as long as
276 years, a no mean achievement, given the circumstances.410 The historical
lesson here is that fighting graft is a multifaceted enterprise.411

401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See generally TIMOTHY BROOK, THE CONFUSIONS OF PLEASURES: COMMERCE AND
CULTURE IN MING CHINA (1999).
408. See generally Dwight H. Perkins, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA, 13681968 (Routledge, 2013).
409. See generally TIMOTHY BROOK, THE TROUBLED EMPIRE: CHINA IN THE YUAN AND
MING DYNASTIES (2013).
410. See generally JOHN W. DARDESS, MING CHINA, 1368-1644: A CONCISE HISTORY OF
A RESILIENT EMPIRE (2012).
411. See generally Anderlini, supra note 400.
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This lesson has apparently been heeded by China’s present leadership
whose anticorruption campaign bears strategic, as well as operational,
similarities to the early Ming dynasty thrust.412 It is thus an integral part of
the vision, realistic or otherwise, and not without politically derived tactical
underpinnings, to realize the “Chinese dream” by erasing the lingering
memories of the “Century of Humiliation”/”Hundred Years of National
Humiliation” (1839-1939) and transforming the country, in the most
comprehensive sense of the term, into a global superpower by 2049, the year
coinciding with the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC.413
The drive to quell corrupt practices has also been accompanied by the
launch of a number of bold economic and national security schemes designed
to position China robustly in the regional and global arenas. In the economic
realm, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the One Belt-One Road
mega project, referred to earlier, have been particularly noteworthy in this
respect. In the national security sphere, the aforementioned military build-up
and muscle flexing in the South China Sea have been equally striking.414 It
should be reiterated, however, that the external economic initiatives have not
been matched by major revitalization programs on the domestic front, with
policy primarily geared toward maintaining stability through
deleveraging/debt reduction415 and containing downward cyclical
pressures.416
At the outset of the Xi Jinping era, an inference might have been drawn
that the multipronged strategy to pursue the Chinese dream, with the
anticorruption campaign at its epicenter, would feature steady progress
toward the rule of law,417 even if in a diluted form envisioned by some
middle-of-the road reformist thinkers.418 This blueprint, grounded in China’s
legalist tradition, was expected to consist of a six-pillar structure including
412. See id.
413. See generally Xi Jinping and the Chinese Dream, DW, https://www.dw.com/en/xijinping-and-the-chinese-dream/a-43685630 (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
414. See generally Hayton, supra note 380; Turcsanyi, supra note 380.
415. See generally China Economic Growth to Support Deep Financial Deleveraging
Reform, ING, https://think.ing.com/articles/chinas-economic-growth-to-support-deep-divefinancial-deleveraging-reform/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
416. See generally Andy Mukherjee, Goodbye China, Deleveraging. Onward Belt and
Road?, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-07-24/goodbye-chinadeleveraging-onward-belt-and-road (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
417. See generally Jacques deLisle, The Rule of Law with Xi-Era Characteristics: Law
for Economic Reform, Anticorruption, and Illiberal Politics, 20 ASIA POL’Y 23 (2015).
418. See generally Wei Pan, Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China, 12 J.
CONTEMP. CHINA 3 (2003).
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meaningful civil liberties (the freedoms of assembly, association, press, and
speech being the most salient), an autonomous judiciary, an independent
antigraft body, a powerful audit unit, a neutral civil service, and extensive
social consultation procedures.419 It has become abundantly clear that most
elements of this semiliberal roadmap no longer loom large on the CCP policy
agenda.420
Initial, mildly positive, expectations regarding evolution of the rule of
law reflected policy rhetoric that seemed to depart from the reverse pattern
observed in the preceding years.421 Specifically, at CCP’s Fourth Plenum,
held in fall of 2014, the new leadership decided to abandon the official
attitude toward the rule of law that emerged around 2005.422 The latter
posture, a reaction to rising but unwelcome bottom-up legal and quasi-legal
advocacy of a seemingly liberal nature,423 as well as the product of fears of
escalating social unrest,424 constituted a discernible move away from the
steps gradually taken to further the rule of law in the previous two decades.425
The principal components of that negative stance were:
[1] A shift away from late 20th-century efforts to promote
judicial activism, coupled with a revival of late 1950s Maoist-era
ideals of judicial populism. [2] A revived focus on mediation,
rather than court trials, as a preferred mechanism for resolving
conflict between citizens as well as between citizens and the
[S]tate. [3] A new [S]tate narrative depicting the law as cold and
unresponsive to citizen needs. [4] A stress on the courts as an
undifferentiated cog within the [S]tate for stability maintenance
(weiwen). [5] A steady reduction in tolerance for the activities of

419. See id.
420. See generally Jeffrey Wasserstrom & Kate Merkel-Hess, Xi Jinping’s
Authoritarianism Does a Disservice to China’s Nuanced Political Tradition, 33 NPQ: NEW
PERSPECTIVES Q. 15 (2016); Sam Crane, https://chinachannel.org/2018/06/29/ legalism/ (last
visited Aug. 31, 2019); Isaac Stone Fish, The Myth of a Kinder, Gentler Xi Jinping, ATLANTIC,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/xi-jinping-authoritarianism-china/
554375/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2019); Francis Fukuyama, China’s ‘Bad Emperor’ Returns,
WASH. POST https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/03/06/xi/ (last
visited Aug. 31, 2019).
421. See generally Carl Minzer, Legal Reform in the Xi Jinping Era, 20 ASIA POL’Y 4
(2015).
422. See id. at 4.
423. See id. at 5.
424. See id. at 5-6.
425. See id. at 4-6.
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public interest (weiquan) lawyers. [6] A new political campaign
reiterating party supremacy over the constitution, law, and courts.
[7] The charging of local officials with the priority task of
containing citizen disputes, conflicts, and petitions at all costs.426
Almost immediately after being catapulted into the political frontline,
Xi Jinping signaled his intention to navigate the ship of State in the opposite
direction.427 The CCP’s Fourth Plenum served as the most visible and
effective platform for forcefully communicating the essence of the latest
strategic turnabout.428 It was not, however, the sole vehicle for conveying the
aim of resolutely pursuing legal reform.429 Importantly, the policy rhetoric
was reinforced with the announcement of a series of concrete measures
whose purpose was to convert the vision into reality.430 The resumed march
toward the rule of law was expected to revolve around the following
initiatives:
[1] [Putting forward] [a]ssertions of legal and judicial reform as a
central priority of Xi’s administration. [2] Attempts to centralize
control over the judicial system and limit the influence of local
officials. [3] A return to concepts of judicial professionalism. [4]
Efforts to steer citizen disputes back to the courts. [5] Revived
emphasis on adjudication and trials at the center of court work. [6]
A renewed focus on the distinctions between the roles of judges
and other [S]tate employees.431
It has soon become amply evident, however, that the strategic
readjustment has amounted to a structural rather than substantive
reconfiguration.432 The managerial approach, and organizational foundation
underpinning it, has been revamped, but the relationship between law,
politics, and society has not been meaningfully redefined.433 A more
formalistic and institutionally calibrated policy has been embraced without
a corresponding ideational repositioning: “The top-down vision of legal
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.

Id. at 4-5.
See id. at 6.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 6-9.
See id.
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reform developing under Xi Jinping’s administration may have more in
common with current trends in the party disciplinary apparatus or historical
ones in the imperial Chinese censorate than it does with Western rule-of-law
norms.”434
As matters stand, significant legal outcomes continue to be shaped by
the interplay between the “rule of the party” and the “rule of law.”435 An
alignment between the two does occur, but misalignment is common.436 Such
conflicts have always been resolved in favor of the former, but the
institutional machinery erected by the present regime and its strategic thrust
has rendered the asymmetry even more pronounced.437 Structural
enhancements notwithstanding,438 this remains a major impediment to
progress, prompting a seasoned observer of China’s legal scene to note that
“[t]here is a Chinese saying that refers to Western medicine as a procedure
that only treats the symptom, whereas Chinese medicine treats the root cause,
[yet] [t]he Fourth Plenum initiative seems, ironically, very much like a strong
dose of Western-style medicine, as far as the metaphor goes.”439
This is not necessarily the product of risk aversion or the result of
endogenously, let alone exogenously, derived constraints.440 The pro-ruleof-law rhetoric, and the selective utilization of legal tools to promote a
specific political agenda, and at the same time subversion of the principles
underlying this institutional architecture are part of a coherent national
strategy.441 Thus, while “[t]hroughout the Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and
Hu Jintao periods, law came to be expected to perform—and to some extent
did perform—supporting functions for the regime’s core agenda: providing
frameworks for market-oriented, internationally open development
strategies; checking potentially development subverting misbehavior, much
of it by party-[S]tate or [S]tate-linked actors; and preempting pressures for
democratic reform … [i]ncipient and likely nontransformative changes in
law’s mandate under Xi point toward a legal order that is still reformist and
developmentalist (in its notion of the rule of law in the economy), more

434. Id. at 4.
435. See Ling Li, Chinese Characteristics of the “Socialist Rule of Law”: Will the Fourth
Plenum Cure the Problems of the Chinese Judicial System?, 20 ASIA POL’Y, 17, 18 (2015).
436. See id. at 18-20.
437. See id.
438. See generally Donald Clarke, China’s Legal System and the Fourth Plenum, 20 ASIA
POL’Y 10 (2015).
439. Li, supra note 435, at 22.
440. See generally deLisle, supra note 417.
441. See id.
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legalist (that is, giving law a larger role in some, but not all, areas), and more
Leninist (in the sense of being less liberal, more top-down, and more
narrowly instrumentalist).”442
The ongoing antigraft campaign, launched following the conclusion of
the 18th National Congress of the CCP, held in 2012, in an unmistakably
forceful but seemingly indeterminate fashion,443 is an integral component of
this strategic blueprint.444 Its essence was conveyed in the form of an “eightpoint code” designed to govern official conduct (baxiang guiding).445 The
rules laid out required public sector employees “to reconnect with the
masses, banned the use of luxury cars, eliminated lavish gifts, and reduced
pomp, banquets, ceremony, bureaucratic visits, and meetings.”446 A
memorable phrase—four dishes and a soup (sicai yitang)—often invoked by
CCP leaders to foster a spirit of frugality, was reembraced in order to infuse
the austerity regime with symbolic virtue.447
The time-honored and potent weapons of criticism and self-criticism,
traditionally relied upon to sow fear and mistrust, were expected to be “wellwielded with some spice to make every party official blush and sweat a

442. Id. at 24.
443. See generally Jon S. T. Quah, Hunting the Corrupt “Tigers” and “Flies” in China:
An Evaluation of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign, MD. SERIES CONTEMP. ASIAN
STUD. 1 (2015); Jinghao Zhou, Will the Communist Party of China Be Able to Win the
Anticorruption Battle? 2 CONTEMP. CHINESE POL. ECON. AND STRATEGIC RELATIONS: AN
INT’L J. 1007 (2016); Kerry Brown, The Anti-Corruption Struggle in Xi Jinping’s China: An
Alternative Political Narrative 49 ASIAN AFF. 1 (2018); Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, Combating Corruption in China: Advances and Problems and
Suppression of Advocates, https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/combat
ing-corruption-in-china-advances-and-problems-and-suppression (last visited Aug. 31,
2019); Guilhem Fabre, The Lion’s Share, Act 2. What Behind China’s Anti-Corruption
Campaign?, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01143800/document (last visited Aug.
31, 2019); Andrew Wedeman, Four Years On: Where Is Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Drive
Headed?, http://theasiadialogue.com/2016/09/19/four-years-on-where-is-xi-jinpings-anti-cor
ruption-drive-headed/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2019); Samson Yuen, Disciplining the Party: Xi
Jinping Anti-Corruption Campaign and Its Limits, www.cefc.com.hk/download.php?file=
dc7e383333eca4f4e9bbe446fc95b63b&id (last visited Aug. 31, 2019); Yuxin Zhang, Why Xi
Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign Won’t Legitimize the CCP, DIPLOMAT, https://thediplo
mat.com/2014/08/why-xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-campaign-wont-legitimize-the-ccp/ (last
visited Aug. 31, 2019).
444. See generally deLisle, supra note 417.
445. See Yuen, supra note 443, at 41.
446. See id.
447. See id. at 41-42.
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little.”448 More specifically and systematically, a “thorough cleanup”449 was
to be undertaken of four objectionable work styles (sifeng): “formalism,
bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance […] in reference to the three ill
winds—subjectivism, sectarianism, and stereotyped Party writing—that
Mao Zedong cited during the Yan’an Rectification Movement in the
1940s.450 In other words, it was devised as a top-down, suitably hazy,
relentless, open-ended, and divisive (for better or for worse, in this particular
context) social mobilization scheme.
Formal legal mechanisms were identified by the post-2012 (“fifthgeneration”) controllers of politico-bureaucratic apparatus, as their policy
agenda fully crystallized and began to be earnestly implemented, as a proper
vehicle for tackling corrupt practices.451 Moreover, such tools have been
selectively but repeatedly resorted to for this manifestly crucial purpose, as
evidenced by the “criminal prosecution of several high-ranking ‘tigers’
(including Chongqing party chief and one-time aspirant to top leadership
positions Bo Xilai and public security head Zhou Yongkang) and many more
lower-ranked-’flies.’”452
This has coincided, however, with the return of illiberal politics in its
ultra-harsh incarnation, depriving the sweeping antigraft project of authentic
rule-of-law underpinnings and rendering it a potential instrument for a
widespread misuse of power.453 For instance,
[a]ffiliates of civil society organizations that seek to promote
legal change or to protect civil rights—such as the HIV and
hepatitis B advocacy organization Yirenping or the five
“feminists” on issues of domestic violence—have been subjected
to police detention[, charged with] “picking quarrels and
provoking troubles” (one of the so-called pocket offenses that
have long been a much-criticized feature of Chinese criminal law),
[and] prosecut[ed] for “illegal business operations” (which NGOs
are often unable to escape because of registering lawfully as an
NGO), “disturbing social order” (for small-scale protest or street
theater), or tax evasion (including in connection with receiving
funds from foreign sources.454
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

Id. at 42.
Id.
Id.
See de Lisle, supra note 417, at 26.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id.
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Such arbitrary and oppressive steps have been taken against the
backdrop of broader legislative initiatives “to regulate the activities of
foreign foundations, restrict funding for Chinese NGOs, and authorize
measures to enhance [S]tate security—the last of these particularly reflecting
concerns about ethno-nationalist unrest among Uyghurs.455
These actions have been pursued against the backdrop of a putatively
academic but in practice intensely managed debate about
“constitutionalism,” evoking in a sharper form Hu Jintao-era repudiation of
finely balanced Western-style politico-legal institutional constellations and
the underlying tenets of “limited government, separation of power, and
liberal rights—advocated by jailed Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo, among
others.”456 In the same spirit, the fifth generation leadership has sought to
curb “discussion of seven pernicious ideas, including Western constitutional
democracy, universal values, civil society, neoliberalism, and Western views
of journalism.”457 The defensively restrictive climate that has emerged has
proved a breeding ground for voices calling for materially limiting access to
Western-type education, including in the field of law, to Chinese students.458
Fragmentation and lack of check-and-balances within the
anticorruption institutional machinery is another characteristic of the system
within which the battle against graft is being waged, consisting of the Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), whose origins may be traced
to the creation, in a quest to bolster party authority and consistency, of the
CCP’s Discipline Supervision Commissions (DSCs) at the central and
provincial levels in 1927; the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP),
established in 1949 with the aim of ensuring that government activities
comply with the law and investigating and prosecuting serious crimes
perpetrated by public officials; the Ministry of Supervision (MOS), formed
in 1954, dissolved in 1959, and restored in 1986 for the purpose of curtailing
corruption in the civil service; and the National Corruption Prevention
Bureau (NCPB), launched in 2007 to primarily fill a gap stemming from the
unavailability of organizational vehicles to address prevention and graft in
the private sector.459

455.
456.
457.
458.
459.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See Quah, supra note 146, at 62-66; Quah, supra note 443, at 23-33.
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The mission of these entities is broadly defined and their operational
domains partly overlap.460 The consequent institutional ambiguity and
incoherence is not as pronounced as might have otherwise been the case due
to the dominance of the CCDI461 and it is expected to diminish further when
the new super anticorruption agency (National Supervisory Commission,
NSC, set up in 2018) becomes fully functional.462 That said, organizational
agendas and their implementation continue to be marked by a high degree of
fuzziness and crisscrossing of institutional boundaries.463 Moreover, this
remains an inordinately politicized edifice at all levels, not subject to any
meaningful independent scrutiny, judicial or other.464
The creation of the NSC, coupled with the introduction of the
Supervision Law designed to govern its operations, while possibly holding
the promise of better top-down steering and horizontal coordination, may
well result in greater politicization, weaker accountability, and widespread
abuse of power exceeding levels presently observed.465 Ostensibly, the
underlying logic is to base the ongoing antigraft campaign on a juridically
sound foundation and refrain from reliance on CCDI’s internal and extralegal mechanisms.466 This potent organization—effectively a fourth branch
of the government, nominally coequal with the State Council (SC), Supreme
People’s Court (SPC), and SPP, and granted an extraordinary mandate and

460. See Quah, Minimizing Corruption in China: Is This an Impossible Dream?, supra
note 146; Quah, Hunting the Corrupt “Tigers” and “Flies” in China: An Evaluation of Xi
Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign (November 2012 to March 2015), supra note 443.
461. See generally Xuezhi Guo, Controlling Corruption in the Party: China’s Central
Discipline Commission, 219 CHINA Q. 597 (2014).
462. See generally China Ramps Up Anti-Corruption Campaign with New Super Agency,
HONG KONG LAWYER http://www.hk-lawyer.org/content/china-ramps-anti-corruption-camp
aign-new-super-agency (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
463. See Quah, Minimizing Corruption in China: Is This an Impossible Dream?, supra
note 146, at 62-66; Quah, Hunting the Corrupt “Tigers” and “Flies” in China: An Evaluation
of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign (November 2012 to March 2015), supra note 443,
at 23-33.
464. See generally Guo, supra note 461; Anderlini, supra note 400; Daniel C. K. Chow,
How China’s Crackdown on Corruption Has Led to Less Transparency in in the Enforcement
of China’s Anti-Bribery Laws, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 685 (2015); Lyric Chen, Who Enforces
China’s Anti-Corruption Laws? Recent Reforms of China’s Criminal Prosecution Agencies
and the Chinese Communist Party’s Quest for Control, 40 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
139 (2017).
465. See generally Jamie P. Horsley, What So Controversial about China’s New AntiCorruption Body?, DIPLOMAT, https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/whats-so-controversial-abo
ut-chinas-new-anti-corruption-body/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2019).
466. See id.
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mighty investigative tools to boot—is to come under the purview of the CCP
alone.467
It is important to note that, whatever their merits and demerits, the
political, rule-of-law, and structural underpinnings of the anticorruption
program dovetail with the cardinal attributes of the current regime and its
leaders’ modus operandi, as outlined above. Such friction-minimizing “fit”
is, ceteris paribus, conducive to smooth implementation, or at least helps to
dampen centrifugal forces.468 By the same token, there can be no doubt about
the campaign’s breadth, durability, ferociousness, and severity. Parts of the
picture, which is still evolving, defy quantification but, as matters stand, a
vast number of cadres—mostly flies, yet in a historically unprecedented
fashion, also some tigers—have been targeted and harshly dealt with,469 at
times in a manner exceeding prevailing, and progressively tighter, legal
standards.470
VIII. Evaluation
The prevailing view is that, at the turn of the second decade of the 21st
century, pernicious forms of graft pervaded virtually every layer of Chinese
society.471 The analytically inspired portrayals reflecting this reading of the

467. See id.
468. See Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, Assessing the Effectiveness of Environmental
Governance Regimes: Remaining Gaps, 12 INTERDISC. ENV. REV. 166 (2011).
469. See generally Quah, supra note 443; Manion, supra note 144; Brown, supra note
443; Yuen, supra note 443; Andrew Wedeman, Xi Jinping’s Tiger Hunt: Anti-Corruption
Campaign or Factional Purge?, 24 MODERN CHINA STUD. 35 (2017); Jingyu Gao, The Impact
of China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign: Have “Tigers” Harbored More “Flies?” (Apr. 1, 2017)
(unpublished M.P.P. thesis, Georgetown University) (on file with the Georgetown University
Institutional Repository); John Griffin, Clark Liu, & Tao Shu, Is the Chinese Corporate AntiCorruption Campaign Genuine?, 29th Annual Conference on Financial Economics &
Accounting 2018; Paris December 2018 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - AFFI; Finance
Down Under 2019 Building on the Best from the Cellars of Finance, https://wpcarey.asu.
edu/sites/default/files/clark_yue_liu_seminar_march_27_2018.pdf; Shujie Leng & David
Wertime, China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign Ensnares Tens of Thousands More, FOREIGN
POLICY (Jan 9, 2015), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/09/chinas-anti-corruption-campai
gn-ensnares-tens-of-thousands-more/; Topic: Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign, SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST, https://www.scmp.com/topics/xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-campaign.
470. See Bribery & Corruption/China, GLOBAL LEGAL INSIGHTS, https://www.globallegal
insights.com/practice-areas/bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regulations/china; Kareena Teh
& Philip Kwok, The Anti-Bribery and Anti-Corruption Review—China, THE LAW REVIEWS,
https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-anti-bribery-and-anti-corruption-review-edition-6/11
51846/china.
471. See Wedeman, supra note 58; PEI, supra note 19.
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situation472 are consistent with collective action-style accounts of the
etiology and dynamics of corruption.473 Such explanatory schemes
emphasize that, when graft is endemic, no one, even those imbued with a
transcendent sense of virtue, can escape its clutches because the costs of
engaging in principled behavior (e.g., financial impairment, loss of
employment, ostracism, physical harm, ridicule, retribution, and
stigmatization) significantly outweigh the benefits.474
An inference has thus been drawn that the CCP, presiding over this
sordid state of affairs and deeply embroiled in the cauldron of corruption, its
apparent role in dramatically and persistently lifting living standards over
three decades notwithstanding, was confronting a serious crisis of
legitimacy, in all likelihood of the existential variety, as China entered the
21st century.475 The massive, steadfast, and unflagging post-2012 antigraft
drive has been depicted as a commensurate response to this enormous
challenge476 and Xi Jinping, its ingenious and venerable architect, as the
party’s and the country’s savior.477 The image and its forceful projection
have enabled Xi to amass official power on a scale unseen during the reform
era.478
This construction, however, has not been universally embraced.479
Notably, some scholars have argued and demonstrated that the CCP has been
able to maintain and, in fact, strengthen its legitimacy in the face of mounting
evidence of corruption, perhaps due to the presence of countervailing
influences.480 Without minimizing the economic and sociopolitical costs of
graft, and refraining from hypothesizing about its long-term repercussions,

472. See Wedeman, supra note 58; PEI, supra note 19.
473. See DAN HOUGH, ANALYSING CORRUPTION 83-87 (2017).
474. See id.
475. See Ho-Fung Hung, When Will China’s Government Collapse?, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar.
13, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/china_communist_party_collapse_downfall/.
476. See Ben Blanchard, China’s Communist Party Thinks a Corruption Crisis Is Its
Biggest Threat to Power, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/
chinas-communist-party-thinks-a-corruption-crisis-is-its-biggest-threat-to-power-2015-9.
477. See Rowan Callick, Communist Party Acclaims Xi Jinping as China’s Saviour,
AUSTRALIAN (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/communist-par
ty-acclaims-xi-jinping-as-chinas-saviour/news-story/157bec57c51ff351485e7.
478. See Analysis: China’s Xi Jinping Amasses Power in Huge Anti-Corruption
Crackdown, NBC (Jan. 1, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2014-year-in-review/a
nalysis-chinas-xi-jinping-amasses-power-huge-corruption-crackdown-n270001.
479. See BROWN, supra note 443; Carolyn L. Hsu, Political Narratives and the Production
of Legitimacy: The Case of Corruption in Post-Mao China, 24 QUAL. SOCIOL. 25 (2001).
480. See Hsu, supra note 478.
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they have claimed and shown that the causal relationship between this
variable and CCP standing has been surprisingly tenuous.481 Rather than a
threat to the regime, let alone an existential one, corruption has been
opportunistically manipulated in the context of an unfolding political
narrative.482
Another empirically supported contrarian assertion put forward by
researchers questioning the mainstream Xi-era antigraft picture pertains to
the efforts of his predecessors.483 The specific contention here is that they
had not necessarily and recklessly turned a blind eye to corruption.484 Indeed,
some institutionally meaningful progress had been made in the shape of
antigraft regulation and enforcement, competition-promoting economic
deregulation, fiscal consolidation, more effective monitoring of local
government activities, a move toward a merit-based civil service, and
revamping of nontransparent and unwieldy budgeting and auditing
procedures.485 The overall level of corruption may have not declined, but its
structure may have fundamentally shifted from internal administrative
processes (embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds) to
bribery.486
Given this backdrop, there has been a tendency to assess the current
antigraft campaign in terms of its motives: an expression of a genuine policy
concern about corruption and its corrosive socioeconomic impacts, an
eagerness to safeguard parochial party interests (including its legitimacy), or
a self-serving desire to solidify Xi Jinping’s power base by providing him
with a blunt instrument to marginalize his rivals.487 The evidence generated
481.
482.
483.

See id.
See id.
See Kilkon Ko & Cuifen Weng, Structural Changes in Chinese Corruption, 211
CHINA Q. 718 (2012).
484. See id.
485. See id.
486. See id.
487. See generally BROWN, supra note 443; Fabre, supra note 50; Manion, supra note
144; Wedeman, supra note 469; Griffin, Liu, & Shue, supra note 469; Li, Roland, & Xie,
supra note 146; Robert Daly, The Mixed Rationales and Mixed Results of Xi Jinping’s
Anticorrruption Campaign, WILSON CENTER (May 11, 2016), https://www.wilsoncenter.
org/article/the-mixed-rationales-and-mixed-results-xi-jinpings-anticorruption-campaign;
Anthony Kuhn, Behind China’s Antigraft Campaign, A Drive to Crush Rivals, NPR (Oct. 25,
2016), antigrafthttps://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/10/25/499206804/behind-china
s-antigraft-campaign-a-drive-to-crush-rivals; Peter Lorentzen & Xi Lu, Personal Ties,
Meritocracy, and China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign, presented at the ‘Political Selection
and Intra-Party Conflicts in China’ paper session for the American Economic Association,
Jan. 4, 2019, available at https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2019/preliminary/668?q=
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in this respect is somewhat mixed in that the data lend tentative support for
all three dispositional alternatives.488 The possibility of the entire set being
relevant cannot be ruled out, with the balance difficult to quantify and
potentially shifting according to circumstances.
This has prompted some observers to question the effectiveness of the
ongoing antigraft program.489 Attention has focused on its political and, by
implication, unavoidably arbitrary and selective nature (intensity, large
scale, and perseverance do not ineluctably translate into consistency,
orderliness, and universal application).490 It is believed that this has
undermined the credibility, legitimacy, and robustness of the multiyear
onslaught on corruption, detracting from its usefulness and potentially
reducing the likelihood of an ultimately successful outcome.491 The fact that
China’s anticorruption credentials, as gauged by the Transparency

eNqrVipOLS7OzM8LqSxIVbKqhnGVrAxrawGlCArI; Shannon Tiezzi, What’s Behind Xi’s
Anti-Corruption Campaign?, DIPLOMAT, Apr. 17, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/
whats-behind-xis-anti-corruption-campaign/; Deng Yuwen, The Three Groups of Untouchables in
China’s Corruption Crackdown, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 5, 2017), https://www.
scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2093109/three-groups-untouchables-chinas-corr
uption-crackdown.
488. See generally BROWN, supra note 443; Manion, supra note 144; Fabre, supra note
150; Wedeman, supra note 469; Daly, supra note 487; Griffin, Liu, and Shu, supra note 487;
Kuhn, supra note 487; Li, Roland, & Xie, supra note 487; Tiezzi, supra note 487; Yuwen,
supra note 487.
489. See supra note 443; Yan Sun & Baishun Yuan, Does Xi Jinping’s Anticorruption
Campaign Improve Regime Legitimacy?, 24 MODERN CHINA STUD. 14 (2017); Guoguang Wu,
Xi’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and the Increasing Uncertainty of Chinese Politics: A
Framework of Analysis, 24 MODERN ASIAN STUD. 95 (2017); John Osburg, Making Business
Personal: Corruption, Anti-Corruption, and Elite Networks in Post-Mao China, 59 CURR.
ANTHROPOL. S149 (2018); Dan Hough, Why Has China’s Anti-Corruption Rating Barely
Budged Despite Thousands of Arrests?, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 23, 2018, https://
www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2134265/why-has-chinas-anti-corruptionrating-barely-budged-despite; Jun Mai, Swept Up in China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign, and
Forsaken by a Secretive, Suspect Legal System, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (July 25, 2018),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2156620/swept-chinas-anti-corr
uption-campaign-and-forsaken; Duan Youzhou, Anti-Corruption in China and CCP’s
Legitimacy, International Conference on Economics, Social Sciences and Languages
(ICESL’14) May 14-15, 2014, Singapore, https://icehm.org/upload/5611ED0514027.pdf.
490. See generally Sun & Yuan, supra note 489; Wu, supra note 489; Osburg, supra note
489; Hough, supra note 489; Mai, supra note 489; Youzhou, supra note 489; Yuen, supra
note 443; Zhang, supra note 443.
491. See generally Sun & Yuan, supra note 489; Wu, supra note 489; Osburg, supra note
489; Hough, supra note 489; Mai, supra note 489; Youzhou, supra note 489; Yuen, supra
note 443; Zhang, supra note 443.
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International indices, have barely budged during this long period has been
invoked in support of such a critical appraisal.492
The picture painted and the underlying reasoning are both valid, but
partially so and the mapping exercise overlooks some crucial elements,
negative as well as positive, because of its unidimensional character. For
instance, mixed-motives, and even self-centered ones, may yield some
societal benefits, whether intended or unintended. To illustrate, there is
empirical evidence to suggest that provinces previously headed by
prosecuted tigers, possibly targeted by Xi Jinping for personal reasons, have
intensified their antigraft efforts, either due to a politically favorable change
of leadership or in order to fend off further pressures from Beijing, or a
combination of the two factors.493 This, in turn, appears to have contributed
to the decline in corrupt practices, at least during the period covered by the
study.494 Such seemingly unexpected patterns may be unearthed when sociolegal phenomena are examined from a multidimensional perspective and in
a manner acknowledging their inherent complexity. LE offers a practical and
viable pathway, albeit without providing a fully integrated and wholly
interdisciplinary analytical framework.
On the positive side, it is evident that the disincentives against
succumbing to corruption have increased exponentially. The data speak for
themselves.495 The figures may well be partly inflated due to the selectively
political nature of the antigraft campaign, but no suggestions have been made
that the possible distortion is sufficiently significant to materially detract
from the representativeness of the picture painted. There can be little doubt
that the probability of being caught has risen substantially because of the
high priority accorded to combating corrupt activities, vast resources
allocated to the mission, and its generally ruthless implementation. Clearly,
the targeting of tigers and the heavy punishment meted out to them has also
enhanced deterrence, even though this may be the most politically salient
component of the program.496
As indicated, it is not merely a matter of a greater probability of being
caught. The importance of the increased severity of punishment should not

492. See Hough supra note 489.
493. See Gao, supra note 469.
494. See id.
495. See Leng & Wertime, supra note 469; Yuen, supra note 443.
496. See generally Quah, supra note 463; Fabre, supra note 50; Sun & Yuen, supra note
489; Wu, supra note 489; Osburg, supra note 489; Fabre supra note 443; Gao, supra note
469; Charting China’s “Great Purge” under Xi, BBC (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-china-41670162.
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be overlooked either.497 It is true that China has long had strong antigraft
laws, as attested by the relevant provisions of Criminal Law of the People’s
Republic of China, which came into effect in 1980, and their modernization
and rejuvenation, undertaken in 1997.498 This legal façade has been markedly
revitalized, however, since Xi Jinping’s ascent to power.499 Perhaps more
significantly, enforcement has been dramatically boosted,500 inevitably
magnifying the deterrent effect of the higher probability of being caught and
heavier legal sanctions.501
By the same token, a sense of fear and suspicion has pervaded the fabric
of post-2012 Chinese society.502 This may be attributable to the authoritarian
oppression that has characterized Xi’s rule.503 The battle stridently and
unremittingly waged against corrupt practices has been a central element of
this equation.504 As pointed out earlier, whatever the broad ramifications of
the climate of mistrust that has abruptly emerged and rapidly spread,
exploiting interpersonal fear and suspicion in the war against graft is
consistent with the theoretical assumptions and empirical findings of
behaviorally inclined LE scholars. It may be a tactic that is particularly
suitable for social conditions such as those prevailing in China, where
corrupt activities have traditionally been channeled through close-knit and
resilient interpersonal networks.505
LE researchers have written sparingly about the internal organization of
anticorruption agencies (ACAs). The issue of the relative merits of

497. See GLOBAL LEGAL INSIGHTS, supra note 470; Teh & Kwok, supra note 470.
498. See generally Global Legal Insights, supra note 470.
499. See id.
500. See id.
501. See Liu Jincheng, China’s Anti-Corruption Fight on Road to Success, CHINA DAILY
(Oct. 27, 2017), http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2017-10/27/content_33761883.htm.
502. See Robert Daly, Xi Jinping, “Rule by Fear”, WILSON CENTER (Feb. 22, 2016),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/xi-jinping-rule-fear.
503. See Charlie Campbell, Five Ways China Has Become More Repressive under Xi
Jinping, TIME (Oct. 6, 2016), http://time.com/4519160/china-xi-jinping-cecc-human-rightsrule-of-law/.
504. See David Lague, Benjamin Kang Lim, & Charlie Zhu, Fear and Retribution in Xi’s
Corruption Purge, REUTERS (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinacorruption-purge-specialreport-idUSKBN0K200320141224.
505. See Zhu, supra note 146; Zheng Chang, Understanding the Corruption Networks
Revealed in the Current Chinese Anti-Corruption Campaign: A Social Network Approach 27
J. CONTEMP. CHINA 735 (2018).
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centralized and decentralized structures remains largely unresolved.506 It
appears that the balance of advantages and disadvantages depends of a host
of situational factors.507 In the particular Chinese context, the organizational
consolidation underway, leading to the creation of a super ACA, the NSC,
may legitimately be regarded as a step forward, if looked at strictly in terms
of operational efficiency, simply because it paves the way for better
coordination and resource utilization.508 Indeed, it may be seen as a reflection
of a wider trend, even if not yet fulfilled, to revamp regulatory bodies with a
view to minimizing bureaucratic inefficiencies and overlapping
responsibilities.509
On the negative side, civil service reforms have resulted in some
improvements on the pay front but not of the magnitude to meaningfully
diminish the appeal of alternative sources of income (other than those of the
legitimate non-wage variety).510 The total package, including fringe benefits
and subsidies, notably those related to housing, is considerably more
attractive511 yet, both in absolute and relative terms, not to the extent of
materially blunting the incentive to seek avenues for generating
506. See Centralized versus Decentralized Anti-Corruption Institutions, Anti-Corruption
Resource Centre & Transparency International (Mar. 16, 2012), https://www.u4.no/publica
tions/centralised-versus-decentralised-anti-corruption-institutions.pdf.
507. See id.
508. See generally Jinting Deng, The National Supervision Commission: A New AntiCorruption Model in China, 52 INT’L J.L., CRIME & JUSTICE 58 (2018); Chen Gang,
Reinforcing Leninist Means of Corruption Control in China: Centralization, Regulatory
Changes and Party-State Integration, 35(2) CPH. J. ASIAN STUD. 30 (2017), available at
https://rauli.cbs/index.php/cjas/article/download/5445/6005; Amos Wittenberg, A Complete
Victory over Corruption? Understanding China’s National Supervision Commission, KYC360
(Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/complete-victory-over-corruption-understan
ding-chinas-amos-wittenberg.
509. See Brunswick Group, 2018 Two Sessions: The Future of China 2 (2018), https://
www.brunswickgroup.com/media/4124/brunswick-china-analysis-npc-2018-2018-03-22.pdf.
510. See generally Hon S. Chan & Jun Ma, How Are They Paid? A Study of Civil Service
Pay in China, 77 INT. REV. ADM. SCI. 294 (2011); ALFRED M. WU, GOVERNING CIVIL SERVICE
PAY IN CHINA (NIAS Press 2014); Stephen Chen & Mimi Lau, Pay Rises for China’s Civil
Servants “Good Move to Fight Corruption”, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 19, 2015),
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1681756/pay-rises-chinas-civil-service-good-mov
e-fight-corruption; Who Wants to Be a Mandarin?, ECONOMIST (June 6, 2015), https://www.
economist.com/china/2015/06/06/who-wants-to-be-a-mandarin; Alexa Olesen, Running
China on $1833 a Month, FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 21, 2015), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/
01/21/running-china-on-1833-a-month-xi-jinping-salary/; Wang Xiangwei, Raising Civil
Servant Pay Will Help Reduce Corruption, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 26, 2014),
https:// www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1519564/raising-civil-servant-pay-will-help-redu
ce-corruption.
511. See Chan & Ma, supra note 510; Wu, supra note 510.
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supplementary income.512 Interestingly, executives at China’s notoriously
inefficient, but susceptible to graft, State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have
experienced no pay rises.513 As pointed out previously, economic reforms
geared toward injecting dynamism into the system and boosting income
growth across the workforce have been conspicuous by their absence in the
Xi Jinping era.
Additionally, the present anticorruption drive is seriously beset by
intractable principal-agent problems. The constant invocation of the lofty
ideal expressed in the notion of the “people” (e.g., equating the regime with
the “People’s Republic”) notwithstanding, it is obvious that today, more than
at any other juncture in past four decades, the CCP considers itself as the
principal in the Chinese body politic and operates as such. The “core
leadership” and the elaborate organizational apparatus upon which it relies
on are, for all intents and purposes, unaccountable to any other institutional
entity. Nothing illustrates this better than the overwhelming support (2958
National People’s Congress/NPC members in favor, two dissenters, sixteen
absentees, and one invalid ballot) for the momentous constitutional change
entailing the removal of term limits to enable Xi Jinping to serve as president
beyond 2023 (practically indefinitely).514
There is thus sufficient evidence to indicate that, while not devoid of
“public interest” elements, and not lacking some unintended positive
consequences, the antigraft campaign has been mostly inspired by a mixture
of offensive and defensive elite-level goals, of the personal as well as
collective type.515 The selective nature of the tiger pursuit lends credence to

512. See Chen & Lau, supra note 510; ECONOMIST, supra note 510; Olesen, supra note
510; Wang, supra note 510.
513. See Koh Gui Qing, China Raises Wages for Government Workers at Least 31
Percent: Document, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinaeconomy-wages-idUSKBN0KT0NS20150120.
514. See Nectar Gan, Xi Jinping Cleared to Stay On as China’s President with Just Two
Dissenters among 2,964 Votes, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.
scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2136719/xi-jinping-cleared-stay-president-chi
nas-political.
515. See generally Fabre, supra note 50; Sun & Yuan, supra note 489; Wu, supra note
489; Osburg, supra note 489; Daly, supra note 487; Fabre, supra note 443; Griffin, Liu, &
Shu, supra note 469; Kuhn, supra note 487; Li, Roland, & Xie, supra note 146; Tiezzi, supra
note 487; Yuen, Disciplining the Party: Xi Jinping Anti-Corruption Campaign and Its Limits,
supra note 443; Yuen, The Three Groups of Untouchables in China’s Corruption Crackdown,
supra note 487; Alexandra Fiol-Mahon, Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign: The Hidden
Motives of a Modern-Day Mao, FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (Aug. 17, 2918),
https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/08/xi-jinpings-anti-corruption-campaign-the-hidden-motiv
es-of-a-modern-day-mao/.
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this argument.516 Indeed, it could be reasonably asserted that the regime’s
top priority should be unhealthy and destabilizing manifestations of
unbalanced growth and socioeconomic disparities, coupled with a quest for
a new developmental model, rather than the eradication of corrupt activities,
with the latter program configured accordingly.517
The personal-cum-political dimension of the antigraft drive has
ineluctably limited its scope and, by extension, operational efficiency. This
fundamental deficiency has been compounded by what LE scholars portray
as “adverse selection”518 and “moral hazard.”519 The former pattern has
materialized when privileged agents have gained access to scarce resources
by virtue of their connections rather than capabilities (i.e., have been
“adversely selected”).520 The latter situation has occurred when the
advantages/safety guarantees explicitly or implicitly granted to such agents
have led to excessive risk-taking (i.e., morally induced hazardous
circumstances), perpetuating corrupt behavior in the process; a carefully
dissected pre-2012 example, which remains relevant, is China’s insurance
industry heavily dependent on informal networks of power brokers within
the CCP organizational pyramid and plagued by issues of dubious agent
credibility.521
The politicization of the antigraft campaign has diminished its
efficacy.522 This may be demonstrated by examining the impact of this

516. See generally Fabre, Xi Jinping’s Challenge: What Is Behind China’s AntiCorruption Campaign?, supra note 50; Sun & Yuan, supra note 489; Daly, supra note 487;
Fabre, The Lion’s Share, Act 2. What Behind China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign?, supra note
443; Kuhn, supra note 487; Yuen, Disciplining the Party: Xi Jinping Corruption Campaign
Anti- and Its Limits, supra note 443; Yuen, The Three Groups of Untouchables in China’s
Corruption Crackdown, supra note 487; Quah, supra note 443; Manion, supra note 144;
BBC, supra note 496; Gao, supra note 469; Wedeman, supra note 443.
517. See generally Fabre, Xi Jinping’s Challenge: What Is Behind China’s AntiCorruption Campaign?, supra note 50; Fabre, The Lion’s Share, Act 2. What Behind China’s
Anti-Corruption Campaign?, supra note 443; Sun & Yuan, supra note 489.
518. See Lijian Qin et al., Adverse Selection in China’s New Rural Cooperative Scheme,
4 CHINA AGRIC. ECON. REV. 69 (2012).
519. See Dayong Zhang et al., Non-Performing Loans, Moral Hazard and Regulation of
the Chinese Commercial Banking System, 63 J. BANK. FINANC. 48 (2016).
520. See, e.g., Griffin, Liu & Shu, supra note 469.
521. See Hilton Root, Corruption in China: Has It Become Systemic?, 36 ASIAN SURV.
741 (1996). See also Charlotte Gao, IMF Warns China of 3 Financial Stability Risks,
DIPLOMAT (Dec. 8, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/imf-warns-china-of-3-financialstability-risks/.
522. See Wu, supra note 489.
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gigantic endeavor at the leadership, elite, and grassroots levels.523 The
picture that emerges shows that the gains progressively shrink as the focus
shifts to lower layers of the social structure.524 The same pattern is observed
when the question of legitimacy is addressed.525 Since legitimacy or lack
thereof may impinge on the ultimate success or failure of policy,526 the
limited acknowledgement of the virtues of the program by ordinary people
and the perception that it has not tangibly enhanced the quality of their daily
lives may reasonably give rise to concerns about its long-term viability.
The challenge is compounded by the fact that the normative and ethical
side of corruption prevention has been accorded little systematic attention,
other than at the rhetorical and ideological level, despite a rich historical
experience of dealing with the issue from that specific angle.527 This has been
carefully documented with reference to the current antigraft drive.528
Needless to say, political education in the Xi Jinping era has intensified
rather than slackened.529 It has largely been confined, however, to ideological
indoctrination and thought control.530 Doubts have been expressed about the
enduring effect of such schemes, which often deepen the sense of alienation
and cynicism among those targeted.531
Perhaps the most egregious disregard for the tenets derived from the
principal-agent model—for all intents and purposes, turning it upside-

523. See id.
524. See id.
525. See Sun & Yuan, supra note 489.
526. See Jennifer Wallner, Legitimacy and Public Policy: Seeing Beyond Effectiveness,
Efficiency, and Performance, 36 POL’Y STUD. J. 421 (2008).
527. See generally Song Ling, Construction of Anti-Corruption Institutions and Culture
in Traditional China and Its Implications for Modern China 32 SOC. SCI. CHINA 162 (2011);
CHONGHAO WU, REGULATING GOVERNMENT ETHICS: AN UNDERUSED WEAPON IN CHINA’S
ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN (Cambridge Univ. Press 2016); Olga Yurievna Adams,
Institutional Approach to Anti-Corruption Efforts in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland
China: Improving the Norms, Strengthening the Ethics, 3 CONTEMP. CHINESE POL. ECON.
STRATEG. RELAT. 247 (2017).
528. See WU, supra note 527.
529. See JINGHAN ZENG, THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY’S CAPACITY TO RULE:
IDEOLOGY, LEGITIMACY, AND PARTY COHESION 115-152 (PALGRAVE MACMILLIAN UK 2016);
Suisheng Zhao, The Ideological Campaign in Xi’s China, 56 ASIAN SURV. 1168 (2016).
530. See Eades, supra note 367; HU PING, THE THOUGHT-REMOLDING CAMPAIGN OF THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY-STATE (Paul van der Velde ed., Philip F. Williams & Yenna Wu
trans., Amsterdam Univ. Press 2012), available at https://www.oapen.org/download?type
=document&docid=425212.
531. See Barry Sautman, Politicization, Hyperpoliticization, and Depoliticization of
Chinese Education, 35 COMP. EDUC. REV. 669 (1991).
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down—is seen in the enormous power vested in the NSC in an institutional
setting devoid of any genuine checks-and-balances. As noted previously,
such a structural constellation opens the way for a flagrant abuse of power.
In this context, it should be additionally pointed out that this Leninist-style
system may well contain the seeds of its own destruction because of the risks
inherent in having unconstrained agents masquerading as principals.532 The
situation is reminiscent of that which prevailed during the Ming dynasty.533
The then corruption inspectors enjoyed great powers without being subject
to any meaningful supervision, other than the ethereal imperatives of
Confucian morality.534 Unsurprisingly, they quickly became heavily
embroiled in corruption themselves.535
As highlighted earlier, there is no firm consensus among LE researchers
about the direction of the relationship between graft and economic
performance, although the distribution of opinion is skewed toward the
negative side. One of the difficulties in this respect lies in the fact that the
role played by intervening/mediating variables is seldom properly taken into
account. A highly compelling explanation of the dynamism exhibited by
China’s economy is institutional in nature and revolves around
decentralization as an intervening/mediating force unleashing latent
entrepreneurial energy in a bottom-up fashion.536 To the extent that heavyhanded recentralization strategies in the Xi Jinping era are aimed at stifling
this force, they may aggravate the country’s economic predicament. It would
be logical to assume that the battle against corruption, which has adverse
implications for the performance of the national economy and its component
parts at the best of times, might conceivably be put on the back burner in
such a testing economic environment and subsequently resurface in a
different form.

IX. Conclusion
532. See generally Gang, supra note 508. See also Minxin Pei, Without an Independent
Judiciary China Cannot Win Its War on Corruption, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-war-on-corruption-judiciary_us_589b5cf0e4b0
4061313adfeb; Jeremy Rhee, The Art of Discipline: The Unintended Consequences of Xi’s
Antigraft Campaign, BROWN POLITICAL REVIEW (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.brownpolitical
review.org/2017/03/art-discipline-unintended-consequences-xis-antigraft-campaign/.
533. See Anderlini, supra note 400.
534. See id.
535. See id.
536. See Xu, supra note 17.
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Chinese manifestations of graft are not a unique phenomenon and, as
evidenced by Transparency International indices,537 China is not necessarily
the most corrupt country in the world. It is undoubtedly burdened with a
decidedly high incidence of graft, but it actually marginally outranks India
and Indonesia, the two other heavily populated Asian countries,538 which are
dealing with the problem in a different and less ironfisted manner.539 The
special features in these extensively reported circumstances are thus the
underlying motives, framing of the issue, its presentation, strategy pursued
in confronting it, and implementation mechanics.
Understandably, these distinct characteristics have loomed large in
media, policy, and scholarly discourse. The purposes of the post-2012
anticorruption drive, conceptualization and communication of the problem it
seeks to rectify, and the campaign’s nature and evolution have been
elaborately depicted. The accounts offered have been mostly descriptive, but
they have not been devoid of normative underpinnings. The latter have
displayed a binary pattern, with the regime and its sympathizers lavishly
extolling the merits of the program and liberally minded commentators
voicing profound concerns about actual and potential abuses of power.
Assessment has also centered, possibly primarily so, on the uncertain
motives behind the mammoth scheme.
Broader forays into evaluative territory have been few and far between.
They have typically also lacked a firm analytical foundation and have not
been undertaken within a cogently integrated conceptual framework. The LE
paradigm applied in this article is neither all-embracing nor a theoretical
panacea, but it provides an appropriately wide perspective that it is
coherently ordered. Graft and its origins are best looked at from an economic
angle, without dogmatically crowding out complementary approaches. As
demonstrated here—whatever China’s cultural, historical, political, and

537. See Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016?gclid=Cj0
KCQjw0dHdBRDEARIsAHjZYYCu5Pio6ef0hUevkcLNbgq.
538. See id.
539. See Jeffrey Hutton, How this Agency Is Waging War Against Corruption in Indonesia
and Winning, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (July 22, 2017), https://www.scmp.com/weekasia/politics/article/2103395/how-agency-waging-war-against-corruption-indonesia-and-win
ning; Lina Vyas & Alfred M. Wu, Why India’ Anti-Corruption Drive May Be a Better Model
for Others than China’s Campaign, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 7, 2018), https://
www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2145021/why-indias-anti-corruption-driv
e-may-be-better-model-others.
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social peculiarities—it is by no means an extreme outlier whose existence
calls into question the validity of this proposition.
An LE-inspired analysis possesses the added advantage of showing that
there two sides to the large-scale, long, and multilevel war waged by Xi
Jinping and his allies against a host of corrupt practices that have
mushroomed in post-1978 Chinese society. First, however much one may
aspire for a softer and potentially more fruitful Indian/Indonesian strategy
for tackling graft, it ought to be acknowledged that, as matters stand, this is
an unrealistic yearning and that, by being consistent with Xi’s leadership
style and overall policy thrust, the anticorruption drive is moving forward in
a less muddled fashion than might have otherwise been expected. Second,
the program has produced some benefits in the form of boosted deterrence,
greater operational efficiency, and structural enhancements, even if at times
of the unintended variety.
At the same time, it is apparent that these selective gains have been
overshadowed by the campaign’s drawbacks and negative repercussions.
The asymmetries besetting the balance of pecuniary incentives and
disincentives faced by public sector employees have not been earnestly
addressed. Above all, the antigraft campaign has been plagued by principalagent problems of such magnitude that they may not be amenable to Xi
Jinping-era-style remedies. Barring a fundamental reorientation across the
entire policy spectrum, amounting to regime reengineering, the battle against
corruption may have to be carried on indefinitely, consuming vast resources
and extinguishing economic vitality in the process, without making farreaching headway on the antigraft front and without substantially bolstering
CCP legitimacy.
China has experienced recurring cycles of centralization and
decentralization in both the revolutionary and reform eras.540 They have
typically entailed administrative tightening and relaxation, with the
government shunning away from genuine marketization of the economy.541
The costs have been enormous and limited long-lasting benefits have been
generated while pressing on in either direction.542 The current centralization
phase may have been implemented more tenaciously than its predecessors
540. See JINGLIAN WU, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM
35-83 (2d ed. 2015); Justin Y. Lin, Ran Tao, & Mingxing Liu, Decentralization, Deregulation
and Economic Transition in China in LAW AND ECONOMICS WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS: INSTITUTIONS FOR PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 466-490 (David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2013),
available at http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/decentralisation/china.pdf.
541. See Wu, supra note 540; Lin, Tao, & Liu, supra note 540.
542. See Wu, supra note 540; Lin, Tao, & Liu, supra note 540.
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and may sustain its momentum for some time, but there is no reason to
believe that the results will be materially different than in the past. Indeed,
undisciplined pursuit of the Chinese dream may culminate in “imperial
overreach,”543 unleashing disruptive forces whose impact may be difficult to
predict. The ultimate fate of the ongoing anticorruption drive hinges on how
the immense tension between the centrifugal and centripetal pressures is
resolved.

543. See Minxin Pei, Two Lessons for China on How to Avoid a Soviet-Style Collapse in
its New Cold War with the US, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.
scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2163200/two-lessons-china-how-a
void-soviet-style; Jonathan Tepperman, China’s Great Leap Backward, FOREIGN POLICY
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/15/chinas-great-leap-backward-xi-jinping/;
David Zweig, Not Just “Containment”: America’s Main Goal May Be to Undermine China’s
Communist Party, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 20, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/
comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2169277/not-just-containment-americas-realgoal-may-be.
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